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Adam M. Dodek*

Lawyering at the Intersection of Public
Law and Legal Ethics: Government
Lawyers as Custodians of the Rule of Law**

Government lawyers are significant actors in the Canadian legal profession, yet
they are largely ignored by regulators and by academic scholarship. The dominant
view of lawyering fails to adequately capture the unique role of government
lawyers. Government lawyers are different from other lawyers by virtue of their
role in creating and upholding the rule of law Most accounts of government
lawyers separate public law duties of government from ethical duties of lawyers;
for example, acknowledging the "public interest" role of government lawyers but
asserting that this has no impact on their ethical duties as lawyers. Instead of this
compartmentalized approach, this article advocates a unified vision of the roles
and responsibilities of government lawyers. Examining the role of government
lawyers should start by recognizing that they operate at the intersection of public
law and legal ethics. Government lawyers are not simply lawyers working in the
public sector Nor are they simply public servants who happen to be lawyers.
They are both lawyers and public servants at the same time. This creates unique
tensions, problems and responsibilities for government lawyers. Government
lawyers do owe a higher ethical duty than other lawyers which is explained through
the concept of government lawyers as custodians of the rule of law. Existing forms
of regulation are adequate for public protection but insufficient in public law terms
to address concerns regarding the exercise of public power Additional forms of
accountability should be created including the development of specific codes
of conduct for government lawyers, proactive disclosure and the creation of an
Office of Professional Responsibility within federal and provincial departments of
justice.
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Les avocats salari6s de l'tat sont des acteurs importants de la profession juridique
canadienne, et pourtant i/s sont largement laissis pour compte par les instances
rdglementaireset les chercheurs universitaires. Le point de vue prddominant sur
la profession ne prend pas adequatement en considdration le rdle unique des
avocats salarids de l'Etat. Ces derniers se diff6rencient des autres avocats par la
nature m~me de leur rle qui est d'6tablir et de faire respecter la primaut6 du droit.
La plupart des r6cits par des avocats salarids de I'itat distinguent les obligations
du gouvernement selon le droit public des fonctions 6thiques des avocats; par
exemple, ils soulignent le volet < intbr6t public > des avocats salari6s de l'Etat
tout en affirmant que cela n'a aucune incidence sur l'exercice de leurs fonctions
6thiques en tant quavocats. L'auteur propose, au lieu de cette approche axee sur
le cloisonnement des rdles, une vision unifi6e des rdles et des responsabilites des
avocats salarids de lI'tat. Une analyse du rle de ces avocats doit commencer
par la reconnaissance du fait qu'ils exercent leur profession 14 o) le droit public
et la ddontologie juridique se croisent. Les avocats salarids de l'Etat ne sont pas
simplement des avocats qui travaillent dans le secteur public, pas plus qu'ils ne
sont uniquement des fonctionnaires qui se trouvent &Otre avocats. Ils sont a la
fois avocats et fonctionnaires. Cela cree pour eux des tensions, des probl~mes
et des responsabilitds uniques. Les avocats salaries de l'Etat ont un devoir
ddontologique plus elev6 que celui des autres avocats, ce qui s'explique par le
concept qu'ils sont les gardiens de la r~gle de droit. Les rbglements existants
sont addquats pour la protection du public, mais sur le plan du droit public, ils
sont insuffisants pour rdpondre aux prdoccupations concernant lexercice du
pouvoir public. // y aurait lieu de crder de nouvelles formes dobligation de rendre
des comptes, notamment des codes de conduite particuliers & I'intention des
avocats salarids de I'Etat, des mesures sur la divulgation proactive et la mise
sur pied d'un bureau de la responsabilit professionnelle au sein des minist~res
f~ddral et provinciaux de la Justice.
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Introduction
We are familiar with the dominant model of the lawyer in Canada: the
advocate, zealously representing his (and now her) client's rights against
the state or another adversary.' We have raised generations of lawyers
on the inspirational words of Lord Brougham in his defence of Queen
Caroline that an advocate "knows but one person in all the world, and that
person is his client" and "[t]o save that client by all means and expedients,
and at all hazards and costs to other persons, and, among them, to himself,
is his first and only duty; and in performing this duty he must not regard
the alarm, the torments, the destruction which he may bring upon others." 2
The dominant model rests on the twin notions of moral non-accountability
by lawyers for the acts of their clients and zealous advocacy, i.e., that the
lawyer must do everything possible within the bounds of law to assist
the client to prevail. These are the foundations of our adversarial system
of justice.' This standard conception continues to dominate our codes of
conduct, lawyers' practice, legal education and depictions of lawyers in
the media and popular culture.4 This dominant view "is everywhere in

I. See Trevor C.W. Farrow, "Sustainable Professionalism" (2008) 46 Osgoode Hall L.J. 51 at 6371.
2. J. Nightingale, ed., Trial of Queen Caroline, vol. 2 (London: J. Robins & Co., 1821) at 8 quoted
in Farrow, ibid. at 64 and n. 68. See also Alice C. Woolley et al., Lawyers' Ethics and Professional
Regulation (Markham, Ont: Lexis Nexis, 2008) at 17 [Woolley, Lawyers'Ethics] quoting Binnie J.
in R: v. Neil, 2002 SCC 70, 3 S.C.R. 631. Most legal ethics teachers in Canada now use the Woolley
text.
3. See David Luban, Legal Ethics and Human Dignity (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press,
2007) 20 [Luban, Legal Ethics].
4.
Farrow, supra note 1.
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Canadian law."' However, there is growing recognition that this view is
flawed both on a descriptive and a normative level.'
This dominant view of what it means to be a lawyer in Canada may
be particularly problematic when it comes to an increasingly large and
important subset of Canadian lawyers: those who work in the public sector.
Canada's largest law entity is actually the federal Department of Justice
and not one of the national law firms. It employs over 5,200 persons, more
than half of whom are lawyers. With over 2,700 lawyers, it is more than
twice the size of the largest law firm.7 It has offices in seventeen cities
across Canada and it has forty-two practice groups specializing in tax,
Aboriginal law, transportation, immigration, civil litigation, terrorism,
international law and many other areas. It is the most frequent litigator
in the Supreme Court of Canada and it advises cabinet ministers and
government agencies.'
Lawyers working in the federal Department of Justice and its provincial
counterparts are significant actors in the Canadian legal profession, both
in terms of sheer numbers of lawyers and the substance of their work.
Yet government lawyers and the work that they do are largely ignored.
They are barely acknowledged in codes of conduct, underrepresented
David Layton, "The Criminal Defence Lawyer's Role" (2004) 27 Dal. L.J. 379 at 381 quoted in
5.
ibid at 64.
6.
Thanks to Richard Devlin for helping me make the connection between my analysis of
government lawyers and the dominant view of lawyering. For examples of critiques or alternative
views see, e.g., Farrow, supra note 1; Allan C. Hutchinson, "Legal Ethics for a Fragmented Society:
Between Professional and Personal" (1998) 5 International Journal of the Legal Profession 175; Allan
C. Hutchinson, Legal Ethics and Professional Responsibility, 2d ed. (Toronto: Irwin Law, 2008) c.
3 [Hutchinson, Legal Ethics]; David M. Tanovich, "Law's Ambition and the Reconstruction of Role
Morality in Canada" (2005) 28 Dal. L.J. 267; Julie Macfarlane, The New Lawyer: How Settlement is
Transforming the Practice of Law (Vancouver: UBC Press, 2008); and Alice C. Woolley, "Integrity in
Zealousness: Comparing the Standard Conceptions of the Canadian and American Lawyer" (1996) 9
Canadian Journal of Law and Jurisprudence 61.
7. These figures are current as of March 31, 2010. See Canada, Department of Justice, Workforce
Representation and Availability as of March 31, 2010 (Ottawa: Department of Justice, 2010) (on
file with author). One year prior to this, there were a total of 3,032 lawyers working throughout the
federal government which would include lawyers in the Department of Justice, prosecutors with
the Public Prosecution Service of Canada and an estimated 150 to 175 lawyers working for other
federal government agencies and Crown corporations. See Government of Canada, Treasury Board
Secretariat, Table 3, Distribution of Public Service of Canada Employees by Designated Group
According to Occupational Category and Group FAA, schedules I and IV Indeterminates, Terms of
Three Months or More, and Seasonal Employees, as at March 31. 2009, online: <http://www.tbs-sct.
gc.ca/reports-rapports/ee/2008-2009/ee-eng.pdf'>.
See Canada, Department of Justice, Canadak Department of Justice, online: <http://canada.
8.
justice.gc.ca/eng/dept-min/pub/about-aprop/>. The Department of Justice has a budget of $900
million. It has seventeen Regional Offices and sub-offices and forty-two Departmental Legal Services
Units co-located with client department and agencies. See Canada, Department of Justice, Report
on Plans and Priorities2009-10, online: <http://www.tbs-sct.gc.ca/rpp/2009-2010/inst/jus/jusOO-eng.
asp>.
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in many law societies and undertheorized in academic scholarship. In
discussions about legal ethics or the regulation of the legal profession
they are often invisible. For these reasons, Allan Hutchinson rightly called
government lawyers "the orphans of legal ethics" because so "little energy
has been directed towards defining and defending the role and duties of
government lawyers." 9 This sharply contrasts with the strong and robust
scholarship that exists regarding the top government lawyer, the Attorney

Allan C. Hutchinson, "'In the Public Interest': The Responsibilities and Rights of Government
9.
Lawyers" (2008) 46 Osgoode Hall L.J. 105 at 106. Notable exceptions include Brent Cotter, "Lawyers
Representing Public Government and a Duty of 'Fair Dealing' (Paper Presented at Canadian Bar
Association, Alberta Law Conference, March 2008) contained in Woolley, Lawyers'Ethics, supra
note 2 at 472; John Mark Keyes, "The Professional Responsibilities of Legislative Counsel" (2009)
3 JPPL 453; Deborah MacNair, "The Role of the Federal Public Sector Lawyer: From Polyester to
Silk" (2001) 50 UNBLJ 125 [MacNair, "The Role of the Public Sector Lawyer"]; Deborah MacNair,
"Solicitor-Client Privilege and the Crown: When is a Privilege a Privilege?" (2003) 82:2 Can. Bar Rev.
213 [MacNair, "Solicitor-Client Privilege and the Crown"]; Deborah MacNair, "In the Service of the
Crown: Are Ethical Obligations Different for Government Counsel?" (2006) 84:3 Can. Bar Rev. 501
[MacNair, "In the Service of the Crown"]; John C. Tait, "The Public Service Lawyer, Service to the
Client and the Rule of Law" (1997) 23 Commonwealth L. Bull. 542; and Joshua Wilner, "Service to
the Nation: A Living Legal Value for Justice Lawyers in Canada" (2009) 32:1 Dalhousie L.J. 177.
The paucity of attention to government lawyers in Canada compares poorly with the attention given to
the subject in the United States. See, e.g., J. Nick Badgerow, "Walking the Line: Government Lawyer
Ethics" (2003) 12:3 Kan. J.L. & Pub. Pol'y 437; Steven K. Berenson, "Hard Bargaining on Behalf
of the Government Tortfeasor: A Study in Governmental Lawyer Ethics" (2005) 56:2 Case W. Res.
L. Rev. 345; Kristina Hammond, "Plugging the Leaks: Applying the Model Rules to Leaks Made by
Government Lawyers" (2005) 18:3 Geo. J. Legal Ethics 783; Anna P. Hemingway, "The Government
Attorney's Conflicting Obligations" (2000) 9:2 Widener J. Pub. L. 227; Gerald B. Lefcourt, "Fighting
Fire with Fire: Private Attorneys Using the Same Investigative Techniques as Government Attorneys;
The Ethical and Legal Considerations for Attorneys Conducting Investigations" (2007) 36:2 Hofstra
L. Rev. 397; Gregory B. LeDonne, "Revisiting the McDade Amendment: Finding the Appropriate
Solution for the Federal Government Lawyer" (2007) 44:1 Harv. J. on Legis. 231; Nancy Leong,
"Attorney-Client Privilege in the Public Sector: A Survey of Government Attorneys" (2007) 20:1 Geo.
J. Legal Ethics 163; Maureen A. Sanders, "Government Attorneys and the Ethical Rules: Good Souls
in Limbo" (1993) 7.1 B.Y.U.J. Pub. L. 39; Jessica Shpall, "A Shakeup for the Duty of Confidentiality:
The Competing Priorities of a Government Attorney in California" (2008) 41:2 Loy. L. A. L. Rev. 701;
W. Bradley Wendel, "Government Lawyers, Democracy, and the Rule of Law" (2009) 77:4 Fordham
L. Rev. 1333; Note, "Government Counsel and Their Obligations" (2008) 121:5 Harvard L. Rev.
1409; Note, "Rethinking the Professional Responsibilities of Federal Agency Lawyers" (2002) 115:4
Harvard L. Rev. 1170. On New Zealand, see Duncan Webb, "Keeping the Crown's Conscience: A
Theory of Lawyering for Public Sector Counsel" (2007) 5:2 N. Z. J. Pub. & 1. L. 243.
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General. 0 In this article, I expend some energy in defining and defending
government lawyers' ethical obligations arising from their role and duties
with reference to the special responsibilities of the Attorney General as
guardian of the rule of law.
My thesis is superficially simple yet likely controversial: government
lawyers are different from other lawyers by virtue of their role in creating
and upholding the rule of law. Most accounts of government lawyers
separate public law duties of government from ethical duties of lawyers; for
example, acknowledging the "public interest" role of government lawyers
but asserting that this has no impact on their ethical duties as lawyers.
Instead of this compartmentalized approach, I advocate a unified vision
of the roles and responsibilities of government lawyers. Examining the
role of government lawyers should start by recognizing that they operate
at the intersection of public law and legal ethics. Government lawyers
are not simply lawyers working in the public sector. Nor are they simply
public servants who happen to be lawyers. They are both lawyers and
public servants at the same time. This creates unique tensions, problems

10. See J. LI. J. Edwards, "The Office of Attorney General: New Levels of Public Expectations
and Accountability" in Philip C. Stenning, ed., Accountabilityfor Criminal Justice. Selected Essays
(Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1995) 294; J. Ll. J. Edwards, "The Attorney-General and the
Canadian Charter of Rights" (1988) 14:4 Commw. L. Bull. 1444; J. Ll. J. Edwards, "The Attorney
General and the Charter of Rights" in Robert J. Sharpe, ed., CharterLitigation(Toronto: Butterworths,
1987) 45; J. Ll. J. Edwards, The Attorney General, Politics and the Public Interest (London: Sweet
& Maxwell, 1984); John Ll. J. Edwards, The Law Officers of the Cmwn (London: Sweet & Maxwell,
1964); Mark J. Freiman, "Convergence of Law and Policy and the Role of the Attorney General"
(2002) 16 Sup. Ct. L. Rev. (2d) 335; Gordon F. Gregory, "The Attorney-General in Government"
(1987) 36 U.N.B.L.J. 59; Grant Huscroft, "Reconciling Duty and Discretion: The Attorney General
in the CharterEra" (2009) 34 Queen's L.J. 773; Grant Huscroft, "The Attorney General and Charter
Challenges to Legislation: Advocate or Adjudicator" (1995) 5 N.J.C.L. 135; Law Reform Commission
of Canada, Controlling Criminal Prosecutions: The Attorney General and the Crown Prosecutor
(Ottawa: Law Reform Commission of Canada, 1990); Debra M. McAllister, "The Attorney General's
Role as Guardian of the Public Interest in Charter Litigation" (2002) 21 Windsor Y.B. Access Just. 47;
Graeme G. Mitchell, "The Impact of the Charteron the Public Policy Process: The Attorney General"
in Patrick Monahan & Marie Finkelstein, eds., The Impact of the Charteron the Public Policy Process
(North York, Ont.: York University Centre for Public Law and Public Policy, 1993) 77; Kent Roach,
"Not Just the Government's Lawyer: The Attorney General as Defender of the Rule of Law" (2006)
31:2 Queen's L.J. 598 [Roach, "Not Just the Government's Lawyer"] ; Kent Roach, "The Attorney
General and the Charter Revisited" (2000) 50:1 U.T.L.J. 1; The Hon. Marc Rosenberg, "The Attorney
General and the Administration of Criminal Justice" (2009) 34 Queen's L.J. 813; The Hon. Ian G.
Scott, "The Role of the Attorney General and the Charter of Rights" (1986-87) 29 Crim. L.Q. 187
[Scott, "The Role of the Attorney General"]; Lori Sterling & Heather MacKay, "The Independence of
the Attorney General in the Civil Law Sphere" (2009) 34:2 Queen's L.J. 891; The Hon. Ian G. Scott,
"Law, Policy, and the Role of the Attorney General: Constancy and Change in the 1980s" (1989) 39
U.T.L.J. 109; and The Hon. R. Roy McMurtry, "The Office of the Attorney General" in Derek Mendes
da Costa, ed., The CambridgeLectures (Toronto: Butterworths, 1981).
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and responsibilities for government lawyers. One example as follows will
demonstrate this point.
The tension between government lawyers' roles as public servants and
as lawyers is seen in the issue of whistleblowing." As lawyers, government
lawyers have an ethical duty to keep confidential "all information
concerning the business and affairs of a client." 2 Each law society has
a limited public safety exception which permits or requires lawyers to
disclose confidential information in certain circumstances. For example,
Nova Scotia's exception provides:
A lawyer has a duty to disclose information necessary to prevent a crime
where
(a) the lawyer has reasonable grounds for believing that the crime is
likely to be committed; and
(b) the anticipated crime involves violence."
This regulatory imperative for Nova Scotia lawyers does not necessarily
accord with federal public servants' whistleblowing provisions.
Under the Public Servants DisclosureProtectionAct, a public servant
may make a public disclosure if there is not sufficient time to make a
report to the relevant official and
the public servant believes on reasonable grounds that the subject-matter
of the disclosure is an act or omission that
(a) constitutes a serious offence under an Act of Parliament or of the
legislature of a province; or
(b) constitutes an imminent risk of a substantial and specific danger to
the life, health and safety of persons, or to the environment. 4

11. For other discussions of whistleblowing by government lawyers see Gavin MacKenzie, Lawyers
and Ethics: Professional Responsibility and Discipline, 4th ed. (Toronto: Carswell, 2006) 21-4 to 215; and MacNair, "In the Service of the Crown," supra note 9 at 529 (noting that the lawyer's ethical
duty of confidentiality being different from the duty to keep governmental information confidential
and it is not clear when one duty trumps another).
12. See Nova Scotia Barristers' Society, Legal Ethics and ProfessionalConduct: A Handbookfor
Lawyers in Nova Scotia (Halifax: Nova Scotia Barristers' Society, May 2010) c. 5, Rule, online:
<http://www.nsbs.org/legalethics/toc.htm> [Nova Scotia Barristers' Society, The Handbook]. See
also: Law Society of Upper Canada, Rules of Professional Conduct (Toronto: LSUC, November
2000) Rule 2.03(1), online: <http://www.1suc.on.ca/regulation/a/profconduct/rule2/> [LSUC, Rules].
See also, Canadian Bar Association, Code of ProfessionalConduct (Ottawa: CBA, 2009) c. 4, Rule,
online: <http://www.cba.org/CBA/activities/pdf/codeofconduct.pdf> [CBA, Code].
13. Nova Scotia Banisters' Society, The Handbook, ibid. at 5.14.
14. Public Servants Disclosure ProtectionAct, R.S.C. 2005, c. 46, s. 16(l).
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There are a number of notable differences between the two provisions. To
begin, the federal law is broader than the Nova Scotia Barristers' Society's
provision. The duty of disclosure for Nova Scotia lawyers extends only to
anticipated crimes involving violence. The federal law speaks of serious
offences without referencing violence and provides alternative grounds
for public disclosure that do not necessarily involve violation of a law. The
Nova Scotia provision is mandatory whereas the federal law is permissive.
These discrepancies raise a variety of questions.
If a Nova Scotia lawyer working for the federal government exercised
her whistleblowing rights as a public servant, would she be violating
her ethical duties under law society codes of conduct? Could a federal
justice lawyer be disciplined by a law society for breaching her duty
of confidentiality in such circumstances? Conversely, if a Nova Scotia
lawyer complied with the ethical duty of disclosure under law society
rules, would she be violating her oath of confidentiality as a public servant
and be subject to discipline by her government employers?
The point is that the answers to these questions are not clear. This
is true of many questions in legal ethics. However, existing legal ethics
doctrine does not have a framework for considering questions like these,
which lie at the intersection of public law and legal ethics. A need exists
for both theoretical exploration and practical mechanisms to address such
questions for government lawyers. I attempt to provide a theoretical and
practical framework for such questions in this paper." This paper proceeds
in three parts. First, I will analyze how government lawyers are different
from other lawyers. This is the necessary foundation for proceeding with
the following parts of the analysis. Second, I will address the question of
whether government lawyers owe different or higher ethical duties than do
other lawyers. I argue that contrary to the prevailing belief, government
lawyers do owe a higher ethical duty than other lawyers, which I explain
through the concept of government lawyers as custodians of the rule of
law. Finally, I will address the question of accountability and regulation of
government lawyers. Specifically, I will examine how government lawyers
are regulated and whether they are over- or under-regulated. I conclude

15. A more general problem exists regarding the law of confidentiality and the law of privilege,
which at times intersect, at times diverge and are often confused by lawyers and judges. See Adam
M. Dodek, "Reconceiving Solicitor-Client Privilege" (2010) 35 Queen's L.J. 493 at 505 [Dodek,
"Reconceiving Solicitor-Client Privilege"]. See generally Alice C. Woolley, Understanding Lawyers'
Ethics in Canada (Toronto: LexisNexis, forthcoming) chapter on confidentiality (draft on file with
author). There are other instances where the legal obligations to disclose information (such as evidence
of a crime or of fraud) clash with the legal obligations of confidentiality. There is no clear rubric for
evaluating these sorts of conflicts either.
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that existing forms of regulation are adequate for public protection but
insufficient in public law terms to address concerns regarding the exercise
ofpublic power. To this end, I propose several added forms ofaccountability
including the development of specific codes of conduct for government
lawyers, proactive disclosure and the creation of an office of professional
responsibility within federal and provincial departments ofjustice.
I. Government lawyers are different
Government lawyers are different and belong in a category. of their own.
Instead, they are largely lumped in with other lawyers generally or with
lawyers for an organization.16 This depiction of government lawyers is
inaccurate and misleading and has created a host of conceptual problems
in thinking about government lawyers and the work that they do. This
failure to recognize the uniqueness of government lawyering has negative
consequences for legal ethics and for public law.
To begin, we must recognize the rise over the past half-century of the
public sector lawyer as a distinct and significant subgroup of lawyers. 17
Public sector lawyers are lawyers who work for a public entity such as the
federal government, the Government of Nova Scotia, the City of Halifax
or Glace Bay, Crown Corporations, public utilities, public regulators
such as the Nova Scotia Securities Commission, agencies, boards and
commissions. In 1961, 6.7% of all Canadian lawyers worked in the public
sector. By 1986, that figure had increased to 10.8%11 and by 2008/09,
an estimated 15-25% of Canadian lawyers worked in the public sector,
depending on the jurisdiction.' 9
Government lawyers constitute a subset of these public sector lawyers.
By government lawyers, I mean lawyers working for the executive branch,
be it on the federal or provincial level. 20 Some 2,700 lawyers work for
the federal Department of Justice, more than the number of lawyers who
16. As discussed infra, it has long been recognized that prosecutors are a distinct type of lawyer with
different ethical responsibilities.
17. For a recognition of govemment lawyers as a distinct occupational subgroup within the Canadian
legal profession, see David A. A. Stager with Harry W. Arthurs, Lawyers in Canada (Toronto:
University of Toronto Press, 1990) c. 12 ("Lawyers in the Public Sector").
18. Ibid. at 158 (Table 6.12).
19. There are no available comprehensive figures but the range of 15-25% is taken from statistics
from the individual law societies.
20. Stager and Arthurs used a slightly different definition. They preferred the term "lawyers in
public administration" as a subject of "lawyers in the public sector." Lawyers in public administration,
according to the authors, include lawyers practicing law in federal, provincial, and local government
and closely-related public agencies such as legal aid centres and community legal clinics. As they note,
this definition of public administration differs from that used by Statistics Canada, which only includes
government departments; Stager & Arthurs, supra note 17 at 279. The category of "government
lawyers" as I define it, is more restrictive.
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work in each of Manitoba, Saskatchewan, New Brunswick, Prince Edward
Island, Newfoundland and Labrador or the three territories. 2 1 Some 1,800
lawyers work for the Ontario Ministry of the Attorney General, making it
the second largest law firm in Canada. More lawyers work for the Ontario
Ministry of the Attorney General than the total lawyers who are members
of the bar in each of New Brunswick, Prince Edward Island, Newfoundland
and Labrador and the three territories. 2 2
The regulation of lawyers operates under a presumption of
homogeneity. 23 As a general matter, we tend to treat the ethical
responsibilities of all lawyers as being the same. The codes of conduct are
drafted with a paradigmatic lawyer in mind and that lawyer is in private
practice.2 4 We do have specialized rules for the criminal context but not
much else. However, the reality is that in Canada we have a fragmented
legal profession and we have had one for some time. 25 Yet when we
examine the codes of conduct for lawyers in this country or the judicial
pronouncements about them, we find a vast oversimplification. Under
the prevailing belief, there are two types of government lawyers: Crown
counsel and all others. Crown prosecutors owe special, higher duties,26
whereas all other government lawyers are treated like private sector
lawyers except that they are "lawyers for an organization." This is both a
gross oversimplification and a misrepresentation of government lawyers.
Government lawyers share some characteristics with private sector
lawyers but there are also critical distinctions between them,27 which
are developed in more detail below. Like corporate counsel, government
lawyers are salaried lawyers for an organization, but for government
lawyers, their organization is "the government." 28 Like lawyers for an
organization, government lawyers' client is also their employer; however,
21. See Federation of Law Societies of Canada, 2007 Law Society Statistics, Total Membership as
at December 31, 2007, online: <http://www.flsc.calen/lawSocieties/statisticsLinks.asp>.
22. See Federation of Law Societies of Canada, 2007 Law Society Statistics, Total Membership as
at December 31, 2007, online: <http://www.flsc.calen/lawSocieties/statisticsLinks.asp>. Department
of Justice lawyers must be members of a provincial law society, although not necessarily of the law
society in which they are working.
23. See MacNair, "In the Service of the Crown," supra note 9 at 501.
24. Gavin MacKenzie, Lawyers and Ethics: Professional Responsibility and Discipline, 4th ed.
(Toronto: Carswell, 2006) 21-3.
25. See Harry W. Arthurs, "Lawyering in Canada in the 21st Century" (1996) 15 Windsor Y.B.
Access Just. 202; Hutchinson, Legal Ethics, supra note 6 at 37-41.
26. See Boucher v. The Queen, [1955] S.C.R. 16 at 23-24; Law Society of Upper Canada, Rules,
supra note 12 at Rule 4.01(3) online: <http://www.1suc.on.ca/regulation/a/profconduct/rule4/> (Duty
of Prosecutor).
27. On some of the characteristics of government lawyers, see MacNair, "The Role of the Public
Sector Lawyer," supranote 9 at 128-29.
28. See MacNair, "The Role of the Federal Public Sector Lawyer," supra note 9 at 128-29.
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unlike working for a corporation, the government lawyer's client-employer
is not in the business of making money. Government is supposed to be in
the business of advancing the "public interest," no matter how unclear that
term maybe. This is the first distinguishing point about government lawyers:
they do not face a clash between professionalism and commercialism the
way private sector lawyers do. 29 It is an obvious and important point, but
government lawyers do not have to worry about marketing, advertising,
or solicitation. They do not need to worry about attracting and retaining
clients because the state is the most reliable client. They do not need to
worry about fees or billing their client and they do not need to worry about
handling client money or trust accounts.30 Unless they move between
government and the private sector, they do not need to address conflicts
of interest between clients. As a result, whole chapters in the applicable
codes of conduct are absolutely irrelevant to government lawyers.3 ' As we
will see later, these distinctions are critical when it comes to law society
regulation of government lawyers.
The defining characteristic of government lawyers is their one and
only client: the Crown.32 Thus, it is both insightful and misleading to treat
government lawyers as lawyers for an organization in the manner in which
most law society codes do. While having the Crown as a client raises
some issues in common with having a corporation for a client, in many
ways it raises very dissimilar ones. This is because the Crown is a very
different type of client from any other organization.3 4

29. Cf ibid at 129.
30. In some governments, lawyers do complete dockets and may charge back client ministries
or departments for work done on matters. However, this is a wholly internal process which is not
accompanied by the financial and ethical pressures that is associated with billing in the private sector.
I am not aware of any circumstances where a government lawyer's remuneration or promotion is tied
to such billing practices. On the ethical problems of the billable hour in Canada, see Alice C. Woolley,
"Evaluating Value: A Historical Case Study of the Capacity of Alternative Billing Methods to Reform
Unethical Hourly Billing" (2005) 12:3 International Journal of the Legal Profession 339 and Alice C.
Woolley, "Time for Change: Unethical Hourly Billing in the Canadian Profession and What Should Be
Done About It" (2004) 83:3 Canadian Bar Review 859.
3 1. For example Nova Scotia Barristers' Society, The Handbook, supranote 12 at cc. 9 ("Protecting
Client's Property"), 12 ("Fees"), 15 ("Making Legal Services Available"), 20 ("Seeking Business").
32. MacNair, "In the Service of the Crown," supra note 9 at 506-07; and MacNair, "The Role of the
Federal Public Sector Lawyer," supra note 9 at 132.
33. MacNair, "In the Service of the Crown" ibid at 516.
34. However, the Supreme Court of Canada has generally treated the Crown as equivalent to other
organizational clients, at least respecting solicitor-client privilege. See Pritchardv. Ontario (Human
Rights Commission), 2004 SCC 31, [2004] 1 S.C.R. 809; and R. v. Campbell, [1999] 1S.C.R. 565.:For
my critique of this see Dodek, "Reconceiving Solicitor-Client Privilege," supra note 15 at 533. Thanks
to Trevor Farrow for pointing this out to me.
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The Crown is a social construct, albeit a very difficult one.35 One of
the greatest Canadian scholars in this field dubbed the Crown "an elusive
phenomenon and a practical institution of government." He compared
the Crown to "an old family ghost that has lingered for centuries doing
little but making its presence felt." 6 The Crown "is the supreme executive
power of the state, above the structure of government in the state, and
designed as a point in the constitution from which other powers are
created, measured, and controlled."" Peter Hogg explains that the Crown
is used "as convenient symbol for the state" and "we commonly speak of
the Crown expropriating a house, of the Crown being sued for breach of
contract, of the Crown being bound by a statute."" In short, the Crown is
a symbol of governmental power and the client of government lawyers.
The idea of the Crown qua client is highly problematic from a legal
ethics perspective. How does a lawyer take instructions from a symbol? Of
course, one does not receive a phone call or an e-mail from the Crown.39
The Crown will not argue about a lawyer's bill or threaten to sue for
malpractice. The Crown is unlikely to complain to the law society about
the conduct of a government lawyer.4 0 These concerns exist for lawyers
for corporations as well, 4 1 but having the Crown as a client raises unique
issues and problems which are addressed below.
Government lawyers are as a consequence rightly obsessed with
the question of who is their client.4 2 Deborah MacNair has answered
the question by explaining that "[i]n essence, the government counsel's
35. Admittedly, the corporation is a completely artificial social construct as well. See Joel Bakan, The
Corporation:The PathologicalPursuitof Profit and Power (New York: Free Press, 2004). However,
the corporate structure is less confusing than government. Corporate counsel may be caught between
management, the Board of Directors and shareholders, but these are clear, identifiable, although at
times competing, bodies.
36. Frank MacKinnon, The Crown in Canada(Calgary: Glenbow-Alberta Institute: McClelland and
Stewart West, 1976) 9.
37. Ibid. at 15.
38. Peter W. Hogg, Constitutional Law of Canada, 5th ed. looseleaf (Toronto: Carswell, 2007) at §
10.1.
39. As Department of Justice lawyer Deborah MacNair has written: "In essence, the government
counsel's ultimate 'human' client will be the public official who has the legal authority to decide the
Crown's interest in the matter." MacNair, "In the Service of the Crown," supra note 9 at 516. Accord
Hutchinson, "In the Public Interest", supranote 9.
40. By this Imean that the Crown qua client is unlikely to complain to the law society. Representatives
of the Crown, specifically, senior government lawyers, are likely to take revelations of misconduct by
lawyers under their supervision very seriously and may encourage lawyers to self-report to the law
society or failing that, report the lawyer directly to the relevant law society. On internal discipline see
infra.
41. The critical difference is that much more discussion and analysis has gone into considering the
role of corporate counsel, both in terms of corporate governance and legal ethics.
42. MacKenzie, supra note 24 at 21-1 ("The issue of who is their client perplexes government
lawyers continually").
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ultimate 'human' client will be the public official who has the legal
authority to decide the Crown's interest in the matter."43 This is surely
correct but it helps little in resolving the tensions that arise in the day-today work of government lawyers." Of course, if the Minister of Transport
has the legal authority to determine a particular issue then the Minister is
the client. But many decisions in government are taken by consensus or
by compromise, without involving the ultimate public official who has
the legal authority to decide the issue. Government lawyers operate in an
environment where the de facto client is the public department or ministry
which is seeking legal advice on the issue.
The manner in which legal advice is provided in government makes
the idea of the ultimate decision-maker as client not particularly helpful in
theory or in practice. In most cases, legal advice is sought by agents of a
minister from agents of the Attorney General. If conflicts rise, then officials
with higher seniority may get involved. To further complicate matters, the
Privy Council Office or Cabinet Office may become involved. To seriously
complicate matters, the Prime Minister's Office or the premier's office
may become involved and communicate instructions on a file for which,
strictly speaking, the Prime Minister or the premier may not be the public
official charged with the legal authority to make that decision. In many
circumstances, it becomes difficult to designate an official as "the client"
with any exactitude.4 5
The "who is the client" problem for government lawyers is related to
the further issue of independence versus client capture. In Canada, unlike
in the United Kingdom,4 6 government legal services are centralized; all
government lawyers are representatives of the Attorney General. 47 The goal
of such centralization is to provide independent legal advice. 48 However,
there is a tension between this independent role and the reality of dealing
with the client agency. Over the past several decades, there has been an
43. MacNair, "In the Service of the Crown," supra note 9 at 516. Accord Hutchinson, supra note 9.
44. For a recent provocative analysis and application of the question of who is the client in the
criminal context within government, see British Columbia (Attorney General) v. Davies, 2009 BCCA
337.
45. This problem is exacerbated by the situation where the individual or group providing instructions
to government lawyers on a matter is different from the individual or group of who may make decisions
about waiver of solicitor-client privilege on the same matter.
46. See Edwards, The Attorney General, Politics and the Public Interest, supra note 10.
47. Canada, Public Prosecution Service of Canada, FederalProsecutionDeskbook (Ottawa: Federal
Prosecution Service, 2000), 9.2.1 Conflicting Policies and Conflict of Interest, online: < http://www.
ppsc-sppc.gc.caleng/fps-sfp/fpd/ch09.html#section9 2 1>.
48. "The value of a lawyer depends on the preservation of his independence from the operating
necessities of his department." Canada, Royal Commission on Government Organization, Report
(Glassco) (Ottawa: Crown, 1962) 419.
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increasing emphasis placed on "client service" for government lawyers,
with a concomitant risk to the independent exercise of judgment by these

lawyers. 49
Justice lawyers may be physically located within the client body
while still coming under the supervision of the Attorney General. This
arrangement creates the advantage of knowledge accumulation and
understanding of the client's business and objectives but also the risk. of
the lawyers becoming "embedded lawyers" who come to identify too
closely with their client and become captured by them. 0 On this front, a
former Deputy Attorney General of New Brunswick warned of
misplaced compassion by civil or criminal legal staff for other bureaucrats
in the government, especially those functioning in the Minister of
Justice's fields of responsibility. Advice that is motivated in any degree
by a desire to refrain from revealing the faults of other bureaucrats or by
an accommodation of the political or policy objectives of other ministries
will impair our confidence in the exercise of the Attomey-General's role
if that advice is supposed to be based on the merits of the situation in the
assessment of the. Attorney-General alone."
At the other end of the equation is independence without accountability.
The government lawyer who sees the Crown in symbolic and not in human
terms may risk self-defining the interests of the Crown and not adequately
taking into account the interests of the client ministry. In the context of
prosecutors, Alice Woolley has expressed concern about accountability
for the power that they wield because they lack a "directing 'client' from
whom they receive instructions."52
Thus, having the Crown as client is only the beginning of the analysis.
It involves a fundamental tension between the two extremes of client

49. See Tait, "The Public Service Lawyer," supra note 9, especially 542-43.
50. The idea of "embedded lawyers" is taken from "embedded journalists." On the issues raised by
the later see, e.g., Martin Bell, "The death of news" (2008) 1:2 Media, War & Conflict 221; Molly A.
Dugan, "Journalism Ethics and the Independent Journalist" (2008) 39 McGeorge L. Rev. 801; Thomas
J. Johnson & Shahira Fahmy, "Embeds' Perceptions of Censorship: Can You Criticize a Soldier Then
Have Breakfast With Him in the Morning?" (2009) 12 Mass Communication & Society 52; and Elana
J. Zeide, "In Bed with the Military: First Amendment Implications of Embedded Journalism" (2005)
80:4 N.Y.U.L. Rev. 1309.
51. Gregory, "The Attorney-General in Government," supra note 10 at 68.
52. Alice C. Woolley, "Prosecutorial Accountability?" The University of Calgary Faculty of Law
Blog on Developments in Alberta Law (12 November 2009), online: <http://ablawg.ca/2009/ll/12/
prosecutorial-accountability>. Some of these issues exist for lawyers for corporations as well. The
difference is that far more scrutiny has been cast on the role of corporate counsel and more analysis
and debate of their ethical and regulatory responsibilities, in comparison to those of government
lawyers.
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capture and independence without accountability. But what does having
the Crown as a client mean for the ethical duties of government lawyers?
II. Lawyering at the intersection ofpublic law and legal ethics
The key to analyzing the ethical responsibilities of government lawyers
is in recognizing that they operate at the intersection of public law and
legal ethics. Within this framework, there is a debate about whether
government lawyers owe a higher ethical duty than private lawyers. It is
clear that Crown prosecutors do, as has been recognized for decades in the
oft-quoted statement of Justice Rand in Boucher v. The Queen:
The role of prosecutor excludes any notion of winning or losing; his

function is a matter of public duty than which in civil life there can be
none charged with greater personal responsibility. It is to be efficiently
performed with an ingrained sense of the dignity, the seriousness and the
justness of judicial proceedings."

However, the consensus in Canada-as reflected in judicial statements,
codes of conduct and by government itself-is that outside of the criminal
context, government lawyers do not owe a higher ethical duty than other
lawyers.5 4
Surprisingly, there are few judicial statements on this topic in Canada.
In one of the rare discussions of the issue, Justice Borins stated in the 1991

case, Everingham v. Ontario, that
Although the Rules of Professional Conduct of The Law Society ofUpper
Canada must necessarily apply to all lawyers, it is my view that one who
is a lawyer employed by the government must be particularly sensitive
to the rules which govern his or her professional conduct. Such a lawyer
may be said to have a higher obligation than lawyers generally."

Justice Borins went on to explain the basis for his decision:
The government lawyer, to use the expression employed by counsel, is
usually one who is a principal legal officer of a department, ministry,
agency or other legal entity of the government, or a member of the legal
staff of the department, ministry, agency or entity. This lawyer assumes
a public trust because the government in all of its parts, is responsible to

the people in our democracy with its representative form of government.
Each part of the government has the obligation of carrying out, in the
public interest, its assigned responsibility in a manner consistent with
the applicable laws and regulations and the Charter of Rights. While
53.
54.
55.
Div.)

Boucher v. The Queen, supra note 26.
See MacNair, "In the Service of the Crown," supra note 9 at 520-22.
Everingham v. Ontario (1991), 84 D.L.R. (4th) 354 at 359, [1991]0.J. No. 3578 (Ont. C.J. (Gen.
(Borins J.).
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the private lawyer represents the client's personal or private interest, the
government lawyer represents the public interest. Although it may not
be accurate to suggest the public is the client of the government lawyer
as the client concept is generally understood, the government lawyer
is required to observe in the performance of his or her professional
responsibility the public interest sought to be served by the government
department, ministry or agency of which he or she is a part. That is why I
believe there is a special responsibility on the part of government lawyers
to be particularly sensitive to the rules of professional conduct.. .6
On appeal, the Divisional Court explicitly rejected Justice Borins'
statements regarding the higher duty of Crown solicitors, finding that
"[lt]here is no basis for this conclusion in the laws or traditions that govern
the bar of this province."" In the key paragraph of its ruling on this issue,
the Divisional Court stated:
All lawyers in Ontario are subject to the same single high standard of
professional conduct. It is not flattering to the lawyers of Ontario to say
that most of them are held to a lower standard of professional conduct
than government lawyers.58
Given the paucity of judicial analysis on the subject, it is important to
provide the basis for the court's decision in full:
The Ministry of the Attorney GeneralAct, R.S.O. 1990, c. M.17, and the
Law Society Act, R.S.O. 1990, c. L.8, codify some of the special public
obligations of the Attorney General in relation to the public interest in
the legal profession and the conduct of government business according
to law. The unique obligations of Crown counsel in the conduct of public
prosecutions are well known. Because of these public obligations and the
traditions associated with the Crown office in this province, the courts
have come to expect a particular level of conduct and expertise from
Crown counsel in various types of judicial business.
It is one thing to say that a particular branch of the Crown law office or a
particular law firm or lawyer has earned a reputation for a high standard
of professional conduct. It is quite different to say that any lawyer or
group of lawyers is subject to a higher standard of liability than that
required of every lawyer under the Rules of Professional Conduct.
In respect of their liability under the Rules of Professional Conduct, as
opposed to the public interest duties associated with their office, Crown
counsel stand on exactly the same footing as every member of the bar.

56.
57.
58.

Ibid. at 359-60.
Everingham v. Ontario (1992), 8 O.R. (3d) 121 at para. 17 (Div. Ct.).
Ibid. at para. 18.
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It is therefore an error of law to exact from government lawyers a higher
standard under the Rules of Professional Conduct than that required of
lawyers in private practice. 9
To the extent that commentators have addressed this subject, they
are in accord. While acknowledging the public interest obligations of
government lawyers, government lawyers Deborah MacNair and John
Mark Keyes conclude that these obligations do not translate into higher
ethical duties.6 0 MacNair asserted:
There is no doubt that government counsel face different policy and
operational concerns, which may give rise to other duties: a duty to
use government litigation and other resources efficiently and to avoid
waste of public funds; a duty to ensure that their 'representation before
the courts is fair and accurate; a duty to avoid letting personal values
and biases override the public policy choices of client officials and the
Crown; a duty to respect the public interest role in their work where
it is appropriate to do so. None of these, however, can fairly be said,
according to the courts or the law societies, to translate into enforceable
higher or special ethical duties."
A 2009 New Brunswick Court of Queen's Bench decision that addressed
this issue would seem to have agreed with the position outlined above 62
while a 2010 Ontario Superior Court decision discussed infra would seem
to disagree.63 As both MacNair and MacKenzie acknowledge, American
courts have been far more willing than their-Canadian counterparts to
impose higher ethical duties on government lawyers." Perhaps reflecting
an uneasiness with the idea of holding government lawyers to the same
rhetorically high but practically modest level of ethical behaviour as other
lawyers, MacKenzie concludes that there is a need to increase standards
for all lawyers, not just government lawyers. 65 This is one approach
but ultimately, I.agree with Justice Borins and believe that he correctly
59. Ibid. at paras. 19-22.
60. MacNair, "In the Service of the Crown," supra note 9 at 528; and Keyes, supra note 9 at 457.
61. MacNair, ibid
62. New Brunswick v. Rothmans Inc., 2009 NBQB 198, [2009] N.B.J. No. 221 at para. 14.
63. See 1784049 Ontario Ltd. (c.o.b. Alpha Care Studio 45) v. Toronto (City), 2010 ONSC 1204,
[2010] O.J. No. 764 at paras. 38-39 [Alpha Care].discussed infra.
64. See, e.g., May Department Stores v. Williamson, 549 F.2d 1147 at 1150 (8th Cir. 1977) per Lay
J. concurring cited by MacKenzie, Lawyers and Ethics, supia note 24 at 21-3 and Bulloch v. United
States, 763 F.2d 1115 (10th Circ. 1985), cert. denied, 474 U.S. 1086 (1986) (perMcKay J., dissenting)
(chastising counsel for failing to make full disclosure during discovery); Douglas v.Donovan, 704 F.2d
1276 (D.C. Cir. 1983) (failing to disclose the existence of a settlement on the basis that government
counsel or a different or higher duty); Braun v. Harris, (E.D. Wis. 1980) cited by MacNair, "In the
Service of the Crown," supra note 9.
65. MacKenzie, Lawyers and Ethics, supra note 24 at 21-3.

18 The Dalhousie Law Journal
captured the issue. Government lawyers should owe higher duties than
other lawyers.
1. The casefor a higher duty
As a matter of public law, government lawyers should owe higher ethical
duties than private lawyers because they exercise public power. In this
section, I will explain why this is the case by reference to the notion of
government lawyers as custodians of the rule of law. I will then show
how in practice, courts and governments already accept that government
lawyers owe higher duties in many contexts.
Normatively, government lawyers should be held to higher ethical
standards than other lawyers because they are exercising public power.
This is what it means to be lawyers for the Crown because the Crown
is the concept that personifies the exercise of state power. As discussed
below, government lawyers are not just passive vessels implementing
the instructions of their political masters. Government lawyers interpret,
advise and advocate on the powers and duties of the Crown. In so doing,
government lawyers exercise public power. This exercise of public power
is therefore the key distinction between government lawyers and all
other lawyers. This is why it is an oversimplification, an understatement
and is misleading to characterize government lawyers as lawyers for an
organization. The source of this heightened ethical duty is therefore to be
found in public law, specifically in the constitutional responsibilities of the
Attorney General.
All government lawyers are agents of the Attorney General and under
the Carltona doctrine, it is recognized that the Attorney General can only
66
fulfill the duties of the office through delegation to his or her agents.
Government lawyers' higher duty therefore derives from the duties
and responsibilities of the Attorney General. That office has a unique
constitutional status in Canada. It has been described as "the guardian of
the public interest" 67 or "the defender of the Rule of Law." 68 Despite Kent
Roach's assertion that "[t]he case for the Attorney General as defender of

66. See CarltonaLtd v. Commissionerof Works, [1943] 2 All ER 560 (CA).
67. See Edwards, The Law Officers of the Crown, supra note 10 at 286-308; Edwards, The Attorney
General, supra note 10 at 138-76. On the public interest see Deborah MacNair, "In the Name of the
Public Good: 'Public Interett' as a Legal Standard" (2006) 10 Can. Crim. L. Rev. 175 [MacNair, "In
the Name of the Public Good"].
68. See, e.g., Ontario, Royal Commission, Inquiry into Civil Rights: Report No. 1, vol. 2 (Toronto:
Queen's Printer, 1968) (Chair: James C. McRuer) 945; and Roach, "Not Just the Government's
Lawyer," supra note 10.
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the rule of law is not an easy one,"6 9 Lori Sterling and Heather Mackay
conclude that "[tihere is a clear consensus that the Attorney General should
actively promote the rule of law." 0 I build on their work but before I do,
I must parenthetically articulate what.I mean by the rule of law which
is, it must be admitted, often invoked rhetorically but without rigourous
attention to what it means.
The rule of law is a foundational concept in Canadian constitutional
law. It is also a notoriously elusive concept, often politicized and frequently
invoked by aggrieved citizens to challenge any perceived unfairness at
the hands of government." There is great debate over "thick" and "thin"
versions of the rule of law. "Thin" versions of the rule of law focus on its
procedural requirements whereas "thick" variants assert that it includes
substantive components such as the protection of rights and freedoms.7 2
For the purposes of this paper, I will invoke the meanings of the rule of
law accepted by the highest court in the land: (1) the law is supreme over
the acts of government and its officials as well as private persons, i.e.,
no one is above the law; (2) the rule of law requires the existence and
maintenance of a positive legal order which provides and preserves the
normative order for our society; and (3) the exercise of all public power
must find its ultimate source in some legal rule." As the Supreme Court
explained in the Secession Reference, the rule of law encompasses
69. Roach, "Not Just the Government's Lawyer," ibid at 600 quoting John Edwards' statement
lamenting "the all-too-common tendency to view the attorney general and his department as no more
than the law firm that is always on call to serve the interests of the political party that is in power at
the time." J. Ll. J. Edwards, "The Office of Attorney General-New Levels of Public Expectations
and Accountability" in Philip C. Stenning, ed., Accountabilityfor Criminal Justice: Selected Essays
(Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1995) 294 at 323.
70. Sterling & Mackay, "The Independence of the Attorney General in the Civil Law Sphere," supra
note 10 at para. 15.
71. In Singh v. Canada (Attorney General), [2000] 3 F.C. 185 at para. 33 (C.A.), Justice Strayer
opined that "[a]dvocates tend to read into the principle of the rule of law anything which supports
their particular view of what the law should be," cited with approval in British Columbia v.Imperial
Tobacco Canada Ltd., 2005 SCC 49, [2005] 2 S.C.R. 473, at para. 62 [Imperial Tobacco Canada
Ltd]. See also ibid at para. 67 ("The rule of law is not an invitation to trivialize or supplant the
Constitution's written terms. Nor is it a tool by which to avoid legislative initiatives of which one is
not in favour. On the contrary, it requires that courts give effect to the Constitution's text, and apply,
by whatever its terms, legislation that conforms to that text.").
72. See Tom H. Bingham, The Rule ofLaw (London: Allen Lane, 2010); T.R.S. Allan, Constitutional
Justice: A Liberal Theory of the Rule of Law (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2001); Brian Z.
Tamanaha, Law as a Means to an End: Threat to the Rule of Law (New York: Cambridge University
of Press, 2006); Brian Z. Tamanaha, On the Rule of Law: History, Politics, Theory (Cambridge:
Cambridge University Press, 2004); Ronald A. Cass, The Rule of Law in America (Baltimore: Johns
Hopkins University Press, 2001); and Joseph Raz, "The Rule of Law and Its Virtue" (1977) 93 Law
Quarterly Review 195.
73. Reference re Secession of Quebec, [1998] 1 S.C.R. 217 at para. 71; Imperial Tobacco Canada
Ltd., supranote 71 at para. 58.
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'a sense of orderliness, of subjection to known legal rules and of
executive accountability to legal authority'. At is most basic level, the
rule of law vouchsafes to the citizens and residents of the country a
stable, predictable and ordered society in which to conduct their affairs.
It provides a shield for individuals from arbitrary state action.7 4
With this understanding of the rule of law, the case for the Attorney
General as its defender becomes more straightforward. The Attorney
General has a statutory duty to "see that the administration of public affairs
is in accordance with the law."" As former Ontario Attorney General Ian
Scott explained,
the Attorney General has a positive duty to ensure that the administration
of public affairs complies with the law. Any discussion of the Attorney
General's responsibilities must keep this fundamental obligation in
mind."6
In the landmark 1968 McRuer Report into Civil Liberties in Ontario,
Commissioner McRuer explained that
[t]he duty of the Attorney General to supervise legislation imposes on
him a responsibility to the public that transcends his responsibility to his
colleagues in the Cabinet. It requires him to exercise constant vigilance to
sustain and defend the rule of law against departmental attempts to grasp
unhampered arbitrary powers, which may be done in many ways.n
Government lawyers operate within a matrix of a rule of law triangle.
Their higher duties are a result of operating at the intersection of three axes:
as delegates of the Attorney General, as public servants and as members of
the legal profession.

74. Reference re Secession of Quebec, [1998] 2 S.C.R. 217 at para. 70 quoting Reference re
Resolution to Amend the Constitution, [1981] 1 S.C.R. 753 at 805-06. The Ontario Court of Appeal
has articulated additional elements to the Rule of Law: respect for minority rights, reconciliation of
Aboriginal and non-Aboriginal interests through negotiations, fair procedural safeguards for those
subject to criminal proceedings, respect for Crown and police discretion, respect for the separation of
the executive, legislative and judicial branches of government and respect for Crown property rights.
See Henco Industries Ltd v Haudenosaunee Sir Nations Confederacy Council (2006), 82. O.R. (3d)
721, [2006] OJ. No. 4790 at para. 142 (C.A.).
75. See, e.g., Ministry of the Attorney General Act, R.S.O. 1990, c. M.17, s. 5(b). Similarly, see
Department of.Justice Act, R.S.C. 1985, c. J-2, s. 4(a) ("see that the administration of public affairs is
in accordance with law").
76. Scott, "The Role of the Attorney General," supra note 10 at 189.
77. Ontario, Royal Commission, Inquiry into Civil Rights: Report No. 1, vol. 2 (Toronto: Queen's
Printer, 1968) (Chair: James C. McRuer) 945 quoted in Scott, ibid. at 192.
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The Attorney General has a clear duty to uphold the rule of law. At
its most basic level, this requires the Attorney General to ensure that all
government action complies with the law. The Attorney General can only
fulfill this duty through his or her agents, government lawyers. Government
lawyers therefore have a delegated responsibility for fulfilling this public
law duty. This is a critical point which distinguishes government lawyers
from other lawyers who do not have such an express duty to ensure that
their client complies with the law. While ethical codes prohibit lawyers
from actively assisting or facilitating their client's commission of illegal
conduct, they do not generally require lawyers to prevent their client
from committing illegal acts." As delegates of the Attorney General,
government lawyers have an affirmative duty that extends far beyond this
minimal general duty of all lawyers. Government lawyers must ensure

*78. See, e.g.. Law Society of Upper Canada, Rules of ProfessionalConduct, Rule 2.02(5) ("When
advising a client, a lawyer shall not knowingly assist in or encourage any dishonesty, fraud, crime,
or illegal conduct, or instruct the client on how to violate the law and avoid punishment."). In this
respect, the recent movement to make corporate counsel "gatekeepers" is a significant departure from
the prevailing ethical status quo. See, e.g., Paul D. Paton, "Corporate counsel as corporate conscience:
ethics and integrity in the post-Enron era" (2006) 84:3 Can. Bar Rev. 533; Paul D. Paton, "The
Independence of the Bar and the Public Interest Imperative: Lawyers as Gatekeepers, Whistleblowers,
or Instruments of State Enforcement?" in Law Society of Upper Canada, Task Force on the Rule of
Law and the Independence of the Bar, In the Public Interest: The Report and Research Papers of
the Law Society of Upper Canada Task Force on the Rule of Law and the Independence of the Bar

(Toronto: Irwin Law, 2007) 175. All codes of conduct have limited future harm exceptions. In most
cases, these entitle but do not require, lawyers to divulge confidential information to prevent specified
types of future harm.
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that all actions of government comply with all laws: civil, criminal and
administrative. The ramifications of this duty are discussed below.
As public servants, government lawyers also have a duty to uphold
the rule of law. As Chair of the Task Force on Public Service Values and
Ethics, former Deputy Minister of Justice John Tait, Q.C. explained:
One of the defining features of public service organizations, especially
in Canada, is that they are established under law and have as one of their
chief roles the administration and upholding of the laws of Canada. In
order to do this well, the public service and individual public servants
should be animated by an unshakable conviction about the importance
and primacy of law, and about the need to uphold it with integrity,
impartiality and judgement.79
Elsewhere Tait asserted that public servants must remember some of the
basic purposes of government "such as democratic accountability, the rule
of law, and fairness and equity."so In short, all public servants have a duty
to uphold the rule of law and government lawyers qua public servants
share in this duty.
As lawyers, government lawyers are part of a profession devoted to
the rule of law, but the perspectives of the profession and of government
are different. As the Law Society of Upper Canada's Task Force on the
Rule of Law and the Independence of the Bar asserted, "[a]n independent
Bar works in tandem with an independent judiciary in the implementation
of the Rule of Law."8 ' The conceptual problem for government lawyers is
that at first glance their position as ladvyers for the government is inimical
to most conceptions of an independent bar. These include the notion that
lawyers are able to put their clients' interest first without fear of constraint
especially by the state.82 It also includes the asserted "right of the public
who need legal assistance to obtain it from someone who is independent of
the state and can thereby provide independent representation."" The other
element of independence of the bar that is problematic for government

79. Canada, Task Force on Public Service Values and Ethics, AStrong Foundation (Ottawa: Canadian
Centre for Management Development, 2000) (John C. Tait, Q.C., Chair) ("Tait Report") 42.
80. Tait, "The Public Service Lawyer," supra note 9 at 547.
81. Law Society of Upper Canada Task Force on the Rule of Law & The Independence of the
Bar, "Statement of Principles on the Rule of Law and the Independence of the Bar" in In the Public
Interest: The Report and Research Papers of the Law Society of Upper Canada's Task Force on the
Rule of Law and The Independence ofthe Bar (Toronto: Irwin Law, 2007) 1 at 1.
82. Law Society of Law Society of Upper Canada Task Force on the Rule of Law & The Independence
of the Bar, "Protecting the Public through an Independent Bar: The Task Force Report" in In the Public
Interest: The Report and Research Papers of the Law Society of Upper Canada s Task Force on the
Rule of Law and The Independence of the Bar (Toronto: Irwin Law, 2007) 3 at 3.
83. Ibid.
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lawyers is the idea of independence from client control: lawyers "should
have autonomy to decide which clients and causes to represent and how
to conduct that representation." 84 As members of the legal profession,
government lawyers are part of a profession dedicated to preserving the
rule of law"; however, in the work that they do as government lawyers,
the bar's conception of independence does not accurately describe their
work.
When the three elements of government lawyers' identity-public
servants, lawyers and delegates of the Attorney General-are combined,
the unique relationship between government lawyers and the rule of law
begins to appear. The core meanings of independence for the bar involve
independence from the state, either in terms of interference with the
lawyer-client relationship by the state or in terms of regulation by the state.
For government lawyers, their client is the state. And as lawyers for the
state, government lawyers are not only tasked with ensuring that the state
and its officials comply with the law, but they are also involved in creating
law in a way that private sector lawyers are not. Government lawyers
are involved in protecting the. rule of law from the inside. Moreover,
what fundamentally distinguishes government lawyers from their nongovernment counterparts is that they exercise state power.
Government lawyers exercise state power in everything they do. There
are some who will challenge this assertion and claim that government
lawyers do not exercise state power but rather they represent the interests
of those who do. This assertion fails to adequately capture the nature of
government lawyers' work. We no longer live in a legal culture dominated
by formalism where we believe that legal reasoning is the process of
finding one true "correct" answer. Rather, we have come to acknowledge
the indeterminacy of law and to acknowledge that there are subjective
influences on legal interpretation. Government lawyers who are advising
their clients on the law exercise power given to them under law. In many
cases, they exercise significant discretion in providing legal advice. The
act of giving legal advice, of interpreting the law, is itself an exercise of
power. It can have a broad impact on people's lives-sometimes equal to
or exceeding that of a Crown counsel in a criminal prosecution. 6 Nowhere

84. Ibid at 7 citing Robert Gordon, "The Independence of Lawyers" (1988) 68 B.U.L. Rev. I at 610.
85. David Luban has described lawyers as "the primary administrators of the rule of law, the point
of contact between citizens and their legal system." See Luban, Legal Ethics, supra note 3 at 1.
86. See MacNair, "In the Name of the Public Good," supranote 67 at 184-85 citing the Department
ofJusticeAct, R.S.C. 1985, c.J-2.

24 The Dalhousie Law Journal
is this more the case nor more important than in the areas of human rights
and constitutional law.
The American example of the torture memos is the best example of
the powerfiul impact that legal advice can have on people's lives." The
act of legal interpretation can be used to constrain or to authorize power.
In this instance, government lawyers used the law not as a constraint
on power, but as "the handmaiden of unconscionable abuse."" In the
words of legal ethicist David Luban, the government lawyers spun their
legal advice because they knew that "spun advice" is what their clients
wanted.89 Lawyers in the Office of Legal Counsel in the Department of
Justice interpreted law to authorize a host of heightened interrogation
methods which most people would identify as torture. Moreover, lawyers
in the Office of Legal Counsel used legal interpretation to create an
entire category of persons who would not be protected by the rule of law
(enemy combatants) and their advice supported the attempt to create a
rule of law-free zone (Guatinamo). While this American example may
be extreme, an important Canadian example demonstrates how the act of
legal interpretation is itself an exercise of state power.
Under the CanadianBill 9f Rights, the Minister of Justice is required
to examine every draft regulation and every government bill introduced in
the House of Commons "in order to ascertain whether any of the provisions
thereof are inconsistent with the purposes and provisions" of the Bill of
Rights and the Minister "shall report any such inconsistency to the House
of Commons at the first convenient opportunity."90 An analogous provision
of the Department of Justice Act requires the Minister to examine every
draft regulation and every government bill introduced in the House of
Commons
in order to ascertain whether any of the provisions thereof are inconsistent
with the purposes and provisions of the CanadianCharterofRights and

Freedoms and the Minister shall report any such inconsistency to the
House of Commons at the first convenient opportunity. 91

87. See David Cole, ed., The Torture Memos (New York & London: The New Press, 2009); Jane
Meyer, The Dark Side (New York: Anchor Books, 2009). See also Joseph Margulies, Guantanamo
andthe Abuse of PresidentialPower (New York: Simon and Schuster, 2007); Philippe Sands, Lawless
World (New York: Viking, 2005); Harold H. Bruff, Bad Advice: Bush r Lawyers in the War on Terror
(Lawrence, Kansas: University Press of Kansas, 2009). For strong legal ethics critique of the Torture
Memos, see Luban, Legal Ethics, supra note 3 at c. 6; and Robert Vischer, "Legal Advice as Moral
Perspective" (2006) 19 Geo. J. Legal Ethics 225.
88. Cole, ibid. at 13.
89. Luban, Legal Ethics, supra note 3 at 164.
90. CanadianBill ofRights, S.C. 1960, c. 44, s. 3.
91. DepartmentofJustice Act, supra note 75, s. 4.1.
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Since 1960 when the CanadianBill ofRights was enacted and since 1982
when the Charter was enacted, there has never been a single report made
to the House of Commons by any Minister of Justice. Some think this is
negative while other are less concerned about it. 92 Here my point is that
every time a decision is made not to make a report to the House ofCommons,
there has obviously been an act of interpretation. Indeed, this was made
clear when a Department of Justice lawyer disclosed at a house committee
that the standard used to trigger the reporting requirement was "manifestly
unconstitutional."9 3 This phrase is itself an act of legal interpretation and a
highly discretionary one at that. If lawyers in the Department had chosen
a standard of "arguably unconstitutional," it is likely that many more bills
would have been reported under these provisions. This could have had a
very different effect on legislation and the relationship between the courts,
the legislature and the executive, to say the least of the potential impact of
such legislation on affected groups.
These arguments for the higher duty of government lawyers as
custodians of the rule of law are supported by existing duties of the Crown
in other areas, government statements and some judicial pronouncements.
In fact, if we examine the conduct expected of government lawyers, we
find that they are already subject to a higher duty than private lawyers.
The standards of conduct expected of government lawyers in areas outside
of criminal law demonstrate that there are a whole host of areas where
a higher duty is expected of government lawyers. Outside of criminal
law, there are other areas where the Attorney General is expected to act
independently, that is without political considerations or involvement.
These include public interest injunctions and interventions.94 Other areas
where the Attorney General represents the public interest include parens
patriae jurisdiction, child protection, expropriation and charities. In

92. Compare Huscroft, "Reconciling Duty and Discretion," supra note 10 at 794 (stating that he
is "neither surprised nor troubled by the fact that no reports of inconsistency have been made in
Canada. After all, the Attorney General is a senior member of Cabinet and will have been privy to the
development of government bills from the outset.") with Roach, "Not Just the Government's Lawyer,"
supra note 10 at 626 (expressing regret that the reporting requirement "has withered on the vine").
93. Hansard, Legislative Committee on Bill C-2, 39th Parliament, 2nd Sess., Evidence, November
15, 2007 (Mr. Rick Dykstra, Chair) at II ("This legislation has been examined and would not be in
front of you if an opinion had been issued to the effect that the legislation in question was manifestly
unconstitutional and could not be defended by credible arguments before a court.") (Mr. Stanley
Cohen, Department of Justice). See also discussion ibid at 12-13, 18-19. See also Hansard, 39th
Parl., 2nd Sess, 23 November 2007 at 1278 (Mr. Joe Comartin and Hon. Rob. Nicholson), 1279 (Hon.
Robert Thibault).
94. See Sterling & Mackay, supra note 10 at 914.
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Aboriginal law, the honour of the Crown doctrine requires the Crown to
consider Aboriginal interests in dealings with Aboriginal peoples."
When government lawyers are dealing with vulnerable parties who
are represented by counsel, a higher standard of conduct may be expected
of them than if the case simply involved two private parties. Thus, in
the public inquiry into the wrongful conviction of Donald Marshall, the
Commission was critical of how the government handled the negotiations
with Mr. Marshall's counsel regarding compensation. Counsel for Nova
Scotia negotiated an objectively good deal for the government which
settled Mr. Marshall's claims for the sum of $270,000. However, the
public inquiry did not view it in this manner. The Commissioners did not
analyze government counsel's actions through the traditional paradigm
of the adversarial model of litigation. Instead, the Commission stated
that the Deputy Attorney General "should have realized that the Donald
Marshall, Jr. compensation question was not merely a routine piece of
civil litigation and the question of fairness needed to be considered. It
was not."96 No further explanation was given as to why this was not an
ordinary piece of civil litigation. If it was because of Crown wrongdoing,
then the Commission did not make clear why counsel for the Crown owed
a higher duty than in other cases of Crown wrongdoing.
In essence, when we put aside the situations where it is recognized that
government lawyers do owe higher duties, we are left with two types of
government lawyering activities: civil litigation against a non-vulnerable
party and advisory functions, including legislative drafting and policy
development. In ordinary civil litigation, government lawyers often do not
behave like their private counterparts.97 For example, in the area of costs,
the Crown routinely foregoes its right to seek costs against the losing
party in litigation or seeks significantly less in indemnification than what
a private party would."
A more recent decision addressing the conduct of government
lawyers against a non-vulnerable party is perhaps more illuminating than
the statements of the Hickman Inquiry regarding government counsel's
95. See R. v. Marshall, [1999] 3 S.C.R. 456 at paras. 46-52. See generally Timothy S. McCabe, The
Honour of the Crown and its Fiduciary Duties to Aboriginal Peoples (Markham, Ont: Lexis Nexis,
2008).
96. Nova Scotia, Royal Commission on the Donald Marshall, Jr., Prosecution, Volume 1:Findings
and Recommendations (Halifax: Province of Nova Scotia, 1989) (Chief Justice T. Alexander Hickman,
Chairman) 137.
97. In some areas, it may be perceived that government counsel are as zealous (or overzealous) as
private lawyers.
98. See Mark M. Orkin, The Law of Costs, 2d ed., looseleaf (Aurora, Ont.: Canada Law Book, 1987-)
s.205.1.
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conduct vis-a-vis Donald Marshall. In a decision unsealed in 2010
involving the disclosure of a privileged report, Justice Michael Code of the
Ontario Superior Court of Justice made the express connection between
counsel's conduct and the government's duty under the rule of law.99
According to Justice Code, it is not enough for a public sector lawyer
to take an adversarial stance in litigation because opposing counsel's
argument is not well-framed. The government lawyer has a duty to ensure
that the government complies with the law: "the importance of the rule
of law as constitutional precept in Canada does not permit this approach
to public administration at any level of government."'o Justice Code's
statements involved the conduct of a lawyer for the City of Toronto. They
have stronger force in the case of lawyers for the provincial or federal
governments because of the constitutional responsibilities of the federal
and provincial Attorneys General.
If the statements of Justice Code are representative of a wider judicial
attitude towards government lawyers, it is likely that many judges expect
more from government counsel-even in ordinary civil litigation cases
where the adversary is a well-resourced private lawyer. I would suspect that
many government lawyers similarly hold themselves to a higher standard
and take very seriously the moniker that they are lawyers for the Crown.
In fact, the mandate, mission and values of the Department of Justice
provide that its lawyers should "provide high-quality legal services" while
"upholding the highest standards of integrity and fairness."'o Thus, the
official policy of the Department of Justice would seem to support the
idea of a higher duty.102 In policy and in practice, government lawyers are

99. Alpha Care, supra note 63.
100. Ibid. at para. 39 citing Reference re Remuneration of the Prov. Court of P.E.I., [1977] 3 S..R.
3 at para. 99; Imperial Tobacco Canada Ltd, supra note 71 at paras. 57-58; Re Manitoba Language
Rights, [1985] I S.C.R. 721 at 748-50. In Alpha Care, Justice Code was critical of the city solicitor
for recommending adopting an adversarial approach in litigation when his legal advice was that the
application brought by the opposing party likely had merit, on grounds not advanced by the opposing
party: Alpha Care, ibid. at para. 37.
101. Canada, Department of Justice, Mandate, Mission and Values (Ottawa: Department of Justice,
2010), online: <http://www.justice.gc.caleng/dept-min/mandat.html>.
102. Whether in practice the prevailing ethos in most government lawyers' offices is to the contrary
is uncertain and unknown because of the lack of empirical work in this area. Some lawyers in private
practice would certainly complain about the tactics taken by government lawyers in particular cases.
Some government lawyers and judges have expressed to me privately their belief that government
lawyers do have a higher duty than lawyers in private practice.
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committed to a higher duty and not simply to the minimal standards of
ethical conduct prescribed in law society rules.o 3

103. In fact, many of the statements contained in The Federal Prosecution Service Deskbook
support the extension of a higher ethical duty to all government lawyers, not just to prosecutors.
The starting point for this assertion lies with statements by government itself. In her foreword to
the Federal Prosecution Service Deskbook, then Justice Minister Anne McLellan reminded federal
prosecutors (and the public) of their role as representatives of the Attorney General in the courts
and exhorted them to "to exemplify 'the Crown' as a symbol of integrity and justice." Minister of
Justice Anne McLellan, "Foreword" in Canada, Department of Justice, The Federal Prosecution
Service Deskbook (Ottawa: Federal Prosecution Service, 2000), online: <http://www.ppsc-sppc.gc.ca/
eng/fps-sfp/fpd/index.html> [Canada, Deskbook]. While The FederalProsecution Service Deskbook
only applies to Crown prosecutors, these exhortations surely apply to all government lawyers. All
government lawyers represent the Crown and therefore personify the Crown in their dealings with
Canadians. The government should want all of their legal representatives to exemplify the Crown "as
a symbol of integrity and justice." Indeed, many of the duties that the Government has articulated for
Crown prosecutors would seem to apply to all government counsel. The Federal ProsecutionService
Deskbook provides that Crown counsel have three overarching duties:
*
The duty to ensure that the responsibilities of the office of the Attorney General are carried
out with integrity and dignity;
*
The duty to preserve judicial independence; and
*
The duty to be fair and appear to be fair;
The Federal Prosecution Service Deskbook, ibid. at § 9.3. In terms of the duty to ensure that the
responsibilities of the office of the Attorney General are carried out with integrity and dignity, the
Deskbook states that:
Counsel can fulfill this duty:
*
by complying with applicable rules of ethics established by their bar association;
*
by exercising careful judgment in presenting the case for the Crown, deciding what
witnesses to call, and what evidence to tender;
*
by acting with moderation, fairness, and impartiality;
*
by not discriminating on any basis prohibited by s. 15 of the Charter;
*
by adequately preparing for each case;
*
by not becoming simply an extension of a client department or investigative agency; and
*
by conducting plea and sentence negotiations in a manner consistent with the policy set out
in this deskbook.
Certainly, there is unlikely to be any debate about the application of items 1,4, 5, or 6 to all government
counsel. Item 7 can only apply to criminal cases. The real issue is the application of items 2 and 3,
which I will return to in a moment. The duty to preserve judicial independence applies mutatis mutando
to all government counsel. According to the Deskbook, counsel can fulfill the duty to preserve judicial
independence:
by not discussing matters relating to a case with the presiding judge without the participation
*
of defence counsel;
*
by not dealing with matters in chambers that should properly be dealt with in open court;
*
by avoiding personal or private discussions with a judge in chambers while presenting a
case before that judge; and
*
by refraining from appearing before a judge on a contentious matter when a personal
friendship exists between Crown counsel and the judge.
Federal Prosecution Service Deskbook, ibid. at § 9.3.2. These responsibilities apply equally to all
government counsel.
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2.

The nature of the Crown 's higher duty as custodians of the rule of
law
It is one thing to argue that the Crown owes a higher ethical duty and it is
another to identify the nature of that duty. In this section, I explain what I
mean by the higher duty of government lawyers as custodians of the rule
of law.
Some have argued that government lawyers have a duty to act impartially
just as Crown prosecutors must.104 I do not think this is the case. Rather, I
think Lorne Sossin was correct when he asserted that there is a spectrum
of ethical responsibilities for government lawyers. '0 However, unlike
Sossin, I believe that the general ethical duties of government lawyers are
not the same as those for private lawyers.' 06 Former Saskatchewan Deputy
Minister of Justice Brent Cotter has argued that government lawyers owe a
duty of "Fair Dealing,"' which involves a duty to consider the community
of interest in opposition to the government. I agree conceptually with
Cotter's approach, but ultimately I feel that it is too difficult to translate
into practical guiding principles for government lawyers, the courts and
the public.
It is perhaps surprising that the idea of special duties owed by
government lawyers remains contentious in Canada. Over ten years
ago, former Deputy Minister of Justice of Canada, John Tait, asserted
that government lawyers owed a number of unique duties including
being "guardians of the rule of law as it applies within government in a
parliamentary democracy."'l He asserted that government lawyers have
a higher duty to the law and to the Constitution.'09 In practical terms, this
means that government lawyers must provide objective and independent
advice. Tait explained:
The duty to promote and uphold the rule of law means that there is a
quality of objectivity in the interpretation of the law that is important
to the public service lawyer. There must be a fair inquiry into what the
law actually is. The rule of law is not protected by unduly stretching
the interpretation to fit the client's wishes. And it is not protected by
giving one interpretation to one department and another to another
department." 0
104. See New Brunswick v.Rothmans Inc., 2009 NBQB 198 at para. 12.
105. See ibid. at para. 14.
106. In another context Sossin has argued in favour of independence for public §ervants. See Lorne
M. Sossin, "Speaking Truth to Power? The Search for Bureaucratic Independence" (2005) 55 U.T.L.J.
1.
107. Cotter, supra note 9 at 472.
108. Tait, "The Public Service Lawyer," supra note 9 at 543.
109. Ibid. at 548.
110. Ibid at 543-44.
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While the ethical precept of providing independent advice applies to all
lawyers,"' it is not infrequently ignored in the private sector under pressure
to tailor legal advice to the client's wishes. Thus, the American legal ethics
scholar Brad Wendel has constructed an entire theory of legal ethics on the
idea of "fidelity to law"-that all lawyers-must treat the law with respect."12
For government lawyers, this means that they must remember that the law
is an end it itself and they must not use the law as a means to achieve an
end."' "In the case of legal ethics, being a good lawyer means exhibiting
fidelity to law, not distorting its meaning to enable the client to do something
unlawful."" 4 In advising the Crown, government lawyers must provide a
fair interpretation of the law. Moreover, as custodians of the rule of law,
they cannot use the law as a sword to batter their opponents, for the rule
of law is intended as a shield against arbitrary government action not as a
weapon in the government's arsenal. Thus, unlike private sector lawyers,
government lawyers should not exploit loopholes in the law in sanctioning
government action or rely on technicalities in litigation.
Being custodians of the rule of law means that government lawyers
must also support other institutions which are critical to the protection
of the rule of law, specifically an independent bar and an independent
judiciary. Government lawyers have a special responsibility to protect
the independence of the judiciary which is a vital component to the rule
of law. How does the abstract principle translate into concrete practice?
For example, in a case where government lawyers have information that
could raise a reasonable apprehension of bias against a judge, it should
be incumbent upon government lawyers to bring this information to
the attention of the court and to the other lawyers in the case, even if
the government lawyer concludes that the apprehension of bias is not a
reasonable one. In such cases, no ethical rules require lawyers to act in
such a way. However, the special responsibilities of government lawyers

Ill. See, e.g., Canadian Bar Association, Code of Professional Conduct, rev. 2006 (Ottawa: CBA,
2006) c. 3, Rule and cmt. 1-3; Nova Scotia Barristers' Society, The Handbook, supra note 6 at c. 4,
Rule 4.20, c. 6, Guiding Principle 2, c. 7, Rule (d)-(g) and Guiding Principle "What is independent
legal advice?" LSUC, Rules, supra note 6 at Rules 2.04(7), 2.06 (2)-(6); and The Law Society of
Alberta, Code of ProfessionalConduct (Calgary: Law Society of Alberta, 2009) cmt. I(h)(i), cmt. 9,
cmt. 12, online: <http://www.lawsociety.ab.calfiles/regulations/Code.pdf>.
112. See generally W. Bradley Wendel, Lawyers and Fidelity to Law (Princeton: Princeton University
Press, 2010). See also W. Bradley Wendel, "The Torture Memos and the Demands of Legality" (2009)
12 Legal Ethics 107; W. Bradley Wendel, "Government Lawyers, Democracy, and the Rule of Law"
(2009) 77 Fordham L.Rev. 1333; W. Bradley Wendel, "Executive Branch Lawyers in a Time ofTerror"
(2008) 31 Dal. L.J. 247.
113. Wendel, "Executive Branch Lawyers in a Time of Terror," ibid.
114. Ibid. at 264.
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to protect the rule of law dictate that they act in a manner to protect the
integrity of the courts."'
The higher duty of government lawyers as custodians of the rule of
law is more difficult when applied to protecting the independence of the
bar, in part due to the contested nature of the term. While self-regulation of
the legal profession is entrenched in Canada, especially in comparison to
other countries, self-regulation is not coterminous with the independence
of the bar as the experience in these other jurisdictions demonstrates. What
being custodians of the rule of law means is that government lawyers
must be especially vigilant against government attempts to interfere
in the lawyer-client relationship. This duty may often overlap with the
duty to ensure compliance with the law because few laws authorize such
interference. Thus, government lawyers should be concerned about reports
which suggest that government agencies are listening in to lawyer-client
communications." 6
III. Accountability and the regulation ofgovernment lawyers
When we examine the regulation of Government lawyers, we are struck
with a paradox. Despite their high percentage in the Canadian legal
profession, it is rare for government lawyers to be subject to law society

115. See Adam M. Dodek, "Constitutional Legitimacy and Responsibility: Confronting Allegations
of Bias after Wewaykum Indian Band v. Canada" (2004) 25 Sup. Ct. L.Rev. (2d) 165.
116. See Andrew Duffy, "CSIS tapped phone despite order; Agents violated solicitor-client privilege,
recorded 171 calls involving accused terrorist" Ottawa Citizen (16 November 2010) Al; and Andrew
Duffy, "Solicitor-client privilege at issue in Harkat hearing" Ottawa Citizen (15 December 2008),
<http://www.canada.com/Solicitor+client+privilege+issue+Harkat+hearing/1079110/story.
online:
html>.
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discipline."' There are a number of possible explanations for this. One
possibility is that the law society discipline process may be deficient in
failing to investigate and sanction misconduct by government lawyers.
Alternatively, the ethical conduct of government lawyers may be higher
than the general legal population so there is a smaller pool of unethical
conduct amongst government lawyers that could come to the attention
of the law society. Finally, there may be structural and internal measures
in place that prevent government lawyers from committing the sorts of
misconduct that would attract law society attention. Each of these three
factors likely contributes to the result. The last explanation-internal
measures-is the most important one as discussed below but the nature of
law society regulation alsb helps to explain why seemingly few government
lawyers are investigated, let alone sanctioned, by law societies.

117. For examples of discipline cases involving government lawyers see Krieger v Law Society of
Alberta (1997) 205 A.R. 243 (Q.B.) [Crown prosecutor fails to disclose DNA test results in murder
case in a timely fashion. The Crown lawyer apologized and noted that he had been disciplined for
this by his superior. Lawyer argued against being disciplined also by the Law Society as double
jeopardy. Law Society asserted that Attorney General does not have power to discipline a lawyer
for professional misconduct because this falls under the jurisdiction of the Law Society Benchers];
R. v. Lindskog (1997) 159 Sask. R. I (Q.B.) [The Crown prosecutor was in a conflict of interest as
he had placed himself in an adversarial position against his former client, in a criminal prosecution,
within a short time frame]; Law Society ofAlberta v. Elander,[1999] L.S.D.D. No. 70 (Law Society
of Alberta Hearing Committee Report) [Lawyer appointed solicitor for a government board, signed an
undertaking not to practice outside the scope of his employment with the Board. Three years later he
began "consulting" work for two firms, which he continued for three years. His estranged wife reported
him to the Crown during their divorce. Lawyer was reprimanded, fined and ordered to pay costs];
Law Society of Saskatchewan v Kirkham, [1999] L.S.D.D. No. 19 (Law Society of Saskatchewan
Discipline Decision) [Crown prosecutor breached his duty to the Court to promptly inform it that
the police had been in direct contact with prospective jurors in a murder trial. Acquitted of charges
by court, law society disciplined with retroactive suspension]; Law Society of British Columbia v.
Kierans, [2001] L.S.D.D. No. 22 (Law. Society of British Columbia Discipline Hearing Decision)
[Sexual harassment issue arises during employment for the Department of Justice]; Law Society of
British Columbia v. Nader, [2001] L.S.D.D. No. 40 (Law Society of British Columbia Discipline
Hearing Decision) [Mr. Nader was appointed to the APEC Commission Inquiry by the Government
of Canada and inflated his hours in an attempt to seek compensation for work he had already done
for his clients previously on a pro bono basis. Lawyer was suspended for 18 months]; Nova Scotia
Barristers'Societyv. Murrant, [2004] L.S.D.D. No. 2 (Nova Scotia Barristers' Society Discipline
Decision) [Barristers' Society disciplines Supreme Court of NS Barrister for professional misconduct.
Lawyer refused to pay child support to ex-wife but wanted to pay directly to daughters to ensure
they receive a university education, which he believed his ex-wife would not have provided with the
support payments. Refusal to pay his ex-wife led the lawyer to a bitter exchange with the Family Div.
Supreme Court using shockingly abusive language in many letters]; Law'Society of British Columbia
v. Suntok, [2005] L.S.D.D. No. 128 (Law Society of British Columbia Discipline Hearing Decision)
[Crown counsel commits assault on his girlfriend after she broke off the relationship. Reprimanded,
suspended for 90 days, undertakings required: abstain from alcohol consumption, practice standards
review, alcohol addiction treatment, pay costs $8,000].
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The raison d'dtre for self-regulation of the legal profession is a
determination that it is in the public interest."' Michael Trebilcock has
argued that the only defensible reason for regulation generally is consumer
protection. On this basis, governments as the consumers of legal services
would not appear to be in need of protection." 9 Rather, for government
lawyers, the imperative for regulation flows not from consumer protection
but from public accountability for the exercise of power. Generally, the
public is not in need of protection from incompetent or abusive government
lawyers in the same manner as they are in need of protection from lawyers
who hold out their services to the public. But the public does have a right
to demand that government lawyers be held accountable for the exercise
of power entrusted to them. The need for accountability flows from
government lawyers' status as custodians of the rule of law. According to
the Chief Justice of Canada, the exercise of power must be both justifiable
and justified: "...societies governed by the Rule of Law are marked by
a certain ethos ofjustification. In a democratic society, this may well
be the general characteristic of the Rule of Law within which the more
specific ideals ... are subsumed. Where a society is marked by a culture of
justification, an exercise of public power is only appropriate where it can
be justified to citizens in terms of rationalityandfairness."'2 0
An ethos of justification can be effectuated through transparency.
In his Report on the Arar Inquiry, Justice Dennis O'Connor wrote that
"[o]penness and transparency are hallmarks of legal proceedings in our
system of justice. Exposure to public scrutiny is unquestionably the most
effective tool in achieving accountability for those whose actions are being
examined and in building public confidence in the process and resulting
decjsion."2 1 Justice O'Connor invoked the words of Justice Fish that "[i]n

118. See, e.g., William H. Hurlburt, The Self-Regulation of the Legal Profession in Canada and in
England and Wales (Calgary: Law Society of Alberta, 2000) 148-51; Legal Profession Act, S.B.C.
1998, c. 9, s. 3.
119. A similar argument would likely apply to other large organizations.
120. The Hon. Madam Justice Beverley McLachlin, "The Roles of Administrative Tribunals and
Courts in Maintaining the Rule of Law" (1998-99) 12 Can. J. Admin. L. & Prac. 171 at 174 cited by
Lebel J. in his concurring reasons in Canadian Union ofPublic Employees Local 79 v. Toronto (City),
2003 SCC 63 at para. 130. See also David Dyzenhaus, "Law as Justification: Etienne Mureinik's
Conception of Legal Culture" (1998) 14 South African Journal on Human Rights 11. Lome Sossin
and I discussed this in more detail in Lome Sossin & Adam Dodek, "When Silence Isn't Golden:
Constitutional Conventions, Constitutional Culture, and the Governor General" in Peter H. Russell &
Lome Sossin, eds., Parliamentary Democracy in Crisis (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 2009)
91 at 96-97.
121. Commission of Inquiry into the Actions of Canadian Officials in Relation to Maher Arar, Report
of the Events Relating to Maher Arar: Analysis and Recommendations, (Ottawa: Public Works and
Government Services Canada, 2006) at 304.
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any constitutional climate, the administration ofjustice thrives on exposure
to light-and withers under a cloud of secrecy."22
On the need for transparency, a former Deputy Attorney General of
New Brunswick has written that media suspicions concerning the exercise
of power by those in government are often based on a lack of information:
"Those on the inside of the wall that surrounds the Attorney-General may
be comfortable in the correctness of their actions, but those on the outside
who lack information and participation are seldom so comfortable. The
public is forced, reluctantly, to rely upon integrity with little information
by which to assess its presence or absence."' 23
1. Existingforms of accountability
Despite the existence of de jure self-regulation, 2 4 in practice Canadian
lawyers are subject to multiple overlapping forms of regulation. They
are subject to regulation by their respective law societies, to internal
regulation through their firm or organization if they practice ,in an
organizational setting,'2 5 the oversight of the courts,'2 6 external regulation
by other regulatory bodies such as securities commissions (domestic and

122. Toronto Star Newspapers Ltd. v. Ontario,2005 SCC 41, 2 S.C.R. 188 at para. 1, quoted in Arar,
ibid.
123. Gordon F. Gregory, "The Attorney-General in Government" (1987) 36 U.N.B.L.J. 59 at 68-69.
124. On the regulation of lawyers in Canada see Harry Arthurs, "The Dead Parrot: Does Professional
Self-Regulation Exhibit Vital Signs?" (1995) 33 Alta. L. Rev. 800; W. Hurlburt, supra note 118; Joan
Brockman, "An Update on Self Regulation in the Legal Profession (1989-2000): Funnel In and Funnel
Out" (2004) 19 C.J.L.S. 55; Alice Woolley, "Re-Envisioning Regulation: 'Canadian Lawyers in the
21' Century"' (2008) 45 Alta. L. Rev. 5; Richard F. Devlin & Porter Heffernan, "The End(s) of SelfRegulation?" (2008) 45 Alta. L. Rev. 169; Duncan Webb, "Are Lawyers Regulatable?" (2008) 45 Alta.
L. Rev. 233; and John M. Law, "Regulation and the Legal Profession" (2008) 45 Alta. L. Rev. 255.
125. See, e.g., Ronald Daniels, "Uncharted Frontiers: The Law Firm as an Efficient Community" (1992)
37 McGill L.J. 801; Marc Galanter & Thomas Palay, Tournament of Lawyers: The Transformation of
the Big Law Firm (Chicago & London: University of Chicago, 1991); Marc Galanter & William
Henderson, "The Elastic Tournament: A Second Transformation of the Big Law Firm" (2008) 60 Stan.
L. Rev. 1867; Marc Galanter & Thomas Palay, "The Many Futures of the Big Law Firm" (1994) 45
S.C.L. Rev. 905; and Marc Galanter & Thomas Palay, "Why the Big Get Bigger: the Promotion-toPartner Tournament and the Growth of Large Firms" (1990) 76 Va. L. Rev. 747.
126. See, &.g., Alice Woolley, "Judicial Regulation of the Legal Profession: Correspondent's Report
From Canada" (2010) 13 Legal Ethics 104. As Woolley notes, the large body of court decisions on
conflicts of interest should be viewed as strong forms of judicial regulation of the legal profession in
Canada. See MacDonaldEstate v. Martin, [1990] 3 S.C.R. 1235, S.C.J. No. 41; R. v. Neil, 2002 SCC
70, S.C.J. No. 72; and Stmther v. 3464920 CanadaInc., 2007 SCC 24, 2 S.C.R. 177.
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foreign),'27 government regulation,'2 8 and tort and insurance. These forms
of regulation operate differently in regulating government lawyers. Each
is analyzed below.
a. Law society regulation
In principle, all lawyers are subject to law society regulation. However,
in practice, there are a number of reasons why government lawyers are
unlikely to attract the attention of law societies. To begin, in Canada most
law society regulation is complaint-based. Most law society complaints
are client-initiated, although complaints may also be received from other
lawyers, from judges or members of the public. Law societies have
jurisdiction to initiate their own complaints when allegations of lawyer
misconduct come to their attention. This power is rarely exercised.
Disgruntled clients are the primary source of complaints to law
societies regarding lawyer misconduct. The Crown is the client of
government lawyers and it is unlikely to make a complaint to the relevant
law society. The government will more likely deal with ethical concerns
internally. Opposing counsel and judges may hesitate to make a complaint
about a government lawyer to a law society, because such complaints may
be perceived to be an extreme act of last resort or a sort of nuclear option
in legal warfare.
Moreover, law societies tend to focus on certain types of complaints that
are unlikely to involve government lawyers. As Harry Arthurs observed,
the "ethical economy" of the legal profession is such that in practice only
certain types of ethical misconduct is likely to attract law society attention.
According to Arthurs, there are essentially only four reasons why lawyers
in Canada are subject to serious discipline: "because they have been guilty
of theft, fraud, forgery or some other criminal offence; because they have
violated a fiduciary duty imposed on them by law; because they are unable
to carry on their practices due to physical or mental disability or serious

127. See Wilder v. Ontario (SecuritiesCommission) (2001), 53 O.R. (3d) 519, O.J. No. 1017 (C.A).
See Sarbanes-OxleyAct of 2002, Pub. L. No. 107-204, §307 (Rules of Professional Responsibility for
Attorneys).
128. For example the federal government attempted to include lawyers in its money laundering
reporting requirements which led to numerous court challenges which stalled the efforts. See Law
Society ofBritish Columbia v. Canada(Attorney General), (2001) BCSC 1593, 207 D.L.R. (4th) 705,
aff'd 2002 BCCA 49, 207 D.L.R. (4th) 736 (C.A.), leave to appeal granted 25 April 2002 and notice
of discontinuance of appeal filed 25 May 2002, [2002] S.C.C.A. No. 52 (QL); Federation of Law
Societies of Canada v. Canada (Attorney General), [2001] A.J. No. 1697 (QL) (Q.B.); Federation
of Law Societies of Canada v. Canada (Attorney General), 2002 NSSC 95, 203 N.S.R. (2d) 53;
FederationofLaw Societies of Canada v. Canada(Attorney General) (2002), 57 O.R. (3d) 383 (Sup.
Ct. J.); and Federationof Law Societies of Canada v. Canada (Attorney General), 2002 SKQB 153,
218 Sask. R. 193.
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addiction; or because they have failed to respond to inquiries from their
governing body." 2 9 It is therefore not surprising that few government
lawyers are disciplined by law societies.'30
b. Tort and insurance
The law of malpractice serves an important function in regulating
the conduct of lawyers. For government lawyers, the tort of malicious
prosecution or abuse of process may be available against the actions of
Crown prosecutors or other lawyers who deal directly with the public.'3 '
In addition to its primary function of compensation, tort law can also serve
an educative function, reminding professionals and the public of their
duties.' 32 Tort law may also function as an ombudsman as Allen Linden
has written: "[i]t can be used to apply pressure upon those who wield
political, economic, or intellectual power."' 33 At present, much of the
work of government lawyers lies beyond the reach of tort law for several
reasons. First, much of the work of government lawyers occurs outside of
public view. As Deborah MacNair has written, "[p]ublic sector lawyers are
public servants whose main characteristic is anonymity. Also, public sector
lawyers are largely hidden from view except to the extent the public reads
about them during a highly publicized trial or commission of inquiry."' 34
Second, the person. who does have knowledge or would be affected by
government lawyer malpractice is the client, that is, the government. The
Crown is unlikely to sue its lawyers for malpractice. Third, as a general
matter, the courts have been unwilling to extend duties of care in tort to
third parties that could be impacted by the actions of government lawyers.
For all of these reasons, tort law does not generally factor into the work of
most government lawyers, outside of prosecutors."
Similarly, while insurance serves an important regulatory function for
Canadian lawyers generally, it is not directly applicable to government
lawyers. All Canadian law societies require lawyers in private practice

129. Arthurs, supranote 124 at 802.
130. Supra note 117.
131. See Nelles v. Ontario, [ 1989] 2 S.C.R. 170, Proulx v. Quebec (Attorney General), 2001 SCC 66,
3 S.C.R. 9. See generally Robert J. Frater, ProsecutorialMisconduct (Aurora, Ontario: Canada Law
Book, 2009) at 14-15.
132. See Allen M. Linden & Bruce Feldthusen, Canadian Tort Law, 8" ed. (Toronto: Lexis Nexis,
2006) at 14-16.
133. lbid at 22.
134. MacNair, "The Role of the Federal Public Sector Lawyer," supranote 9 at 127.
135. On legal malpractice see generally Raj Anand, "Professional Liability" in Adam M. Dodek &
Jeffrey H. Hoskins, eds., CanadianLegal Practice: A Guide for the 21st Century (Toronto: Lexis
Nexis, 2009) c. 11.
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to carry malpractice insurance. 1 6 Consequently, it has developed that in
private practice, insurance acts as a powerful regulatory tool. Lawyers
are trained to put their insurer on notice at the slightest possibility of a
claim. This creates a culture of awareness, attuned to mistakes or ethical
missteps. For government lawyers, insurance does not operate as an
effective regulatory mechanism. Many. government lawyers are simply
exempt from insurance."' Moreover, government is self-insured and
government lawyers are indemnified by their employer, the government.3 8
Insurance may have an indirect impact where government counsel is
sued and outside counsel is retained through the government's insurer to
defend the action. Outside counsel may provide an independent external
assessment of the conduct of the government counsel which may trigger
further internal discipline processes.
c. Judicialoversight
The courts play an important but limited role in regulating lawyers. To state
the obvious but important point, courts only regulate the conduct of counsel
appearing before them. Courts play no role therefore in the oversight of
government lawyers outside of litigation. Moreover, while courts possess
a broad array of common law powers including contempt, they are only
exercised in cases of professional misconduct. A 2008 report of complex
criminal cases in Ontario, identified the overlapping regulatory functions
of the courts, the Law Society, legal aid and the Attorney General's office.
The report found that as a result of this overlapping jurisdiction, "no one
seems to take lead responsibility" and "[a]s a result, there are almost never
any serious consequences when professional misconduct occurs in the
court room."'3 9 Moreover, the problem with judicial regulation is that it

136. See M. Christine Fotopoulos with Robin A.F. Squires "Professional Indemnity" in Adam M.
Dodek & Jeffrey H. Hoskins, eds., CanadianLegal Practice(Toronto: Lexis Nexis, 2009) c. 12.
137. See Law Pro, "Insurance for government lawyers, educators and lawyers working in legal
aid clinics funded by Legal Aid Ontario," online: .<http://www.lawpro.ca/insurance/Practicetype/
government educators.asp>.
138. MacNair, "The Role of the Federal Public Sector Lawyer," supra note 9 at 140 noting that the
Treasury Board is self-insured and the DOJ does not generally pay for professional insurance, with the
exception of lawyers in the Atlantic Regional Office in Nova Scotia. Justice lawyers are covered by the
Treasury Board's Policy on the Indemnification of and Legal Assistance for Crown Servants, Treasury
Board of Canada Secretariat, Policy on LegalAssistanceand Indemnification, (Ottawa: Treasury Board
Secretariat, 2008), online: <http://www.tbs-sct.gc.ca/pol/doc-eng.aspx?id=13937&section-text>.
139. Ontario, Report of the Review of Large and Complex Criminal Case Procedures (Toronto:
Ontario Ministry of the Attorney General, 2008) (The Hon. Patrick J. LeSage and Professor Michael
Code), online: <http://www.attomeygeneral.jus.gov.on.calenglish/about/pubs/lesagecode/chapter
6.asp>.
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is episodic rather than systematic. Individual judges deal with individual
lawyers; there is no cumulative effect on lawyer misbehaviour.14 0
d. Legislative oversight
The Attorney General is accountable to the legislature for all acts taken
by his or her agents' 4 1 but such oversight is infrequently and only lightly
exercised. Legislative oversight can take various forms. In the case of
the accountability of the Attorney General, oversight occurs only through
the requirement to respond to questions in the legislature. Professor John
Edwards, the leading Commonwealth expert on the Attorney General
concluded in 1988 that "An examination of the proceedings in Parliament
and the provincial legislatures during the past quarter of a century will
quickly confirm that such occasions of public accountability have been
singularly sparse in number." 42 Like judicial oversight, legislative
oversight is wholly reactive and restricted to matters of public knowledge.
However, this need not be.
There are proactive models of legislative accountability. The
Canadian Bill of Rights and the Department of Justice Act require the
Attorney General to report to Parliament any inconsistency with the
CanadianBill of Rights or the Charter.There have been no such reports
in Canada. However, in enacting the New ZealandBill ofRights Act 1990,
New Zealand adopted a similar provision and the Attorney General of
New Zealand has made reports to the New Zealand legislature 43 and has
gone a step further and disclosed the reasons therefore as well as the legal
advice as to why a report is or is not required.'" In the United States, it has

140. Thanks to Alice Woolley for raising this point with me.
141. See Philip C. Stenning, Appearing for the Crown (Toronto: Brown Legal Publications, 1986) at
302 (quoting former Attorney General of Ontario John Clement) cited with approval by R. v.Lindsay,
[2004] O.J. No. 3952 (Sup. Ct. J.) (Q.L.) at para. 26.
142. J. Ll. J. Edwards, "The Attorney-General and the Canadian Charter of Rights" (1988) 14
Commw. L. Bull. 1444 at 1446 (noting further that "It is possible to enumerate with no difficulty at all
the few instances in which a full scale attempt has been made to define for the assembled legislators
the nature of the office of the Attorney-General and the responsibilities of this important portfolio."
(citing sources)).
143. See Grant Huscroft, "The Attorney-General, the Bill of Rights, and the Public Interest" in Grant
Huscroft & Paul Rishworth, eds., Rights and Freedoms (Wellington, NZ: Brooker's, 1995) 133; Paul
Rishworth et al., The New Zealand Bill of Rights (Melbourne: Oxford University Press, 2003) c. 6;
Grant Huscroft, "Is the Defeat of Health Warnings a Victory for Human Rights? The Attorney-General
and Pre-Legislative Scrutiny for Consistency with the New Zealand Bill of Rights" (2003) 14 Public
Law Review 109; Janet Hiebert, "Rights-Vetting in New Zealand and Canada: Similar Idea, Different
Outcomes" (2005) 3 New Zealand Journal of Public and International Law 63.
144. New Zealand, Ministry of Justice, Advice provided by the Ministry ofJustice and the Crown Law
Office to the Attorney-General on the consistency ofBills with the Bill ofRights Act 1990 (Wellington:
New Zealand Ministry of Justice, 2010), online: <http://www.justice.govt.nz/policy-and-consultation/
legislation/bill-of-rights>.
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been suggested that the Attorney General be required to appear before and
report to Congress. In short, legislative oversight of Government lawyers
in Canada is limited and wholly reactive.
e. Internal regulation
The internal regulation of government lawyers is significant but largely
unknown to the public. It is likely the most important explanatory variable
for the infrequency of law society discipline actions against government
lawyers. Government lawyers are subject to multiple forms of internal
regulation and risk management that many of their counterparts in the
private sector are not. To begin, government lawyers do not work in
isolation. They work in formal practice groups or units. Their work is
often subject to multiple levels of approvals which sometimes leads to
complaints about drafting "by committee." As public servants, government
lawyers are subject to frequent formal performance appraisals. There are
government policies and manuals to be followed, such as the Federal
Prosecution Service Deskbook.14 5 As explained in the Deskbook:
The Department ofJustice is organized to foster principled, competent and
responsible decision making. One of the goals of the Federal Prosecution
Service Deskbook is to assist counsel in making the numerous difficult
decisions which arise in criminal litigation. In so doing, it sets objective
standards against which prosecutorial conduct may be measured.146
There are other handbooks and manuals in other areas as well.14 7
Lifelong learning has been recognized as a critical tool in many fields
to ensure the continued competency of professionals. 148 While mandatory
continuing legal education is new to the Canadian legal profession,149 it is
one of the great strengths of working in the public sector, both in terms
of internal continuing education programs and support and opportunities
for government lawyers to attend external conferences and workshops.
Additionally, while the legal profession frequently bemoans the decline of
mentoring, one place where mentoring thrives is in the public sector. Senior
counsel are able to formally and informally mentor more junior counsel.
All of these activities may be considered proactive forms of regulation.

145. Canada, Deskbook, supra note 103.
146. Ibid. at 8.3 Accountability, online: <http://www.ppsc-sppc.gc.caleng/fps-sfp/fpd/ch08.html>.
147. The Federal Prosecution Service Deskbook is the only such manual that the federal Department
of Justice has made public. This lack of transparency is discussed in part infra.
148. See generally Jocelyn Downie & Richard Devlin, "Fitness for Purpose: Mandatory Continuing
Legal Ethics Education for Lawyers" (2009) 87 Can. Bar Rev. 773.
149. See ibid and see the articles on lifelong learning contained in the 2010 volume of the Canadian
Legal Education Annual Review (CLEAR).
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In terms of reactive regulation, there are a number of elements. It
is possible for a lawyer, a judge or a member of the public to complain
to a government lawyer's superior about that lawyer's conduct. Neither
the frequency of such complaints nor their disposition is known because
there is no public disclosure by government of the existence let alone the
disposition of such complaints. 5 o Recently, in Ontario, a protocol was
created allowing judges to refer lawyers to the Law Society of Upper
Canada if the judge finds that the lawyer's conduct is unacceptable. The
Ontario Ministry of the Attorney General is a party to this protocol and
complaints regarding provincial government lawyers may be referred to it
for mentoring of the lawyer, if appropriate."'
While departments of justice have their own discipline and grievance
procedures,' 52 neither the procedures nor the results are published. This
is unfortunate because public service discipline of counsel is likely
a significant feature of the regulation of the conduct of government
lawyers. It also goes a long way in explaining why law society discipline
databases are not filled with reported cases of government lawyers. Senior
government lawyers take these issues very seriously and, commensurate
with the notion of a higher duty, would likely operate such institutional
discipline systems irrespective of law society rules.
2. Additional accountabilitymechanisms
The above forms of accountability are sufficient in terms of the regulation
of the ethical conduct of government lawyers compared to other lawyers.
Indeed, they far exceed existing systems of regulation for most lawyers.
The creation of multiple, overlapping preventative systems ensures
competence and professional development of government lawyers. If
we were only concerned with ensuring the minimal ethical conduct of
government lawyers, we would conclude that these suffice. But because
government lawyers owe a higher duty as custodians of the rule of law and
150. One high-profile example of a complaint made against a government lawyer involved the
review of the wrongful conviction of David Milgaard. Counsel for Mr. Milgaard alleged that a
conflict of interest existed regarding the involvement of former Saskatchewan Crown Counsel who
prosecuted the Milgaard case with the federal Department of Justice. Counsel for Mr. Milgaard filed
a formal complaint with Minister of Justice Kim Campbell asking her to intervene in the matter. See
Commission of Inquiry Into the Wrongful Conviction of David Milgaard, Report of the Commission
of Inquiry into the Wrongful Conviction of DavidMilgaard (Hon. Mr. Justice Edward P. MacCallum,
Commissioner) (2008) at 199.
151. Law Society of Upper Canada, Protocol: Referral of Mentoring Requests (September 2009),
online: <www.lsuc.on.ca/medialoct0I09_protocolnnr.pdf>. See Thomas Claridge, "Use mentoring
to deal with courtroom misconduct: Law Society of Upper Canada" The Lawyers Weekly (2 October
The
2009), online: <http://www.lawyersweekly.calindex.php?section=article&articleid=1008>.
protocol applies to both civil and criminal counsel, in both government and private practice.
152. See MacNair, "The Role of the Federal Public Sector Lawyer," supranote 9 at 140.

Lawyering at the Intersection of Public Law and Legal Ethics:
Government Lawyers as Custodians of the Rule of Law

41

because they exercise public power, we must demand more of them. As
Deborah MacNair has written, "[p]ublic sector lawyers are public servants
whose main characteristic is anonymity. Also, public sector lawyers are
largely hidden from view except to the extent the public reads about them
during a highly publicized trial or commission of inquiry."'I Government
lawyers exercise power through legal interpretation and again as MacNair
has written, "public decision-makers are expected to act responsibility, to
be accountable for their actions and to be open to scrutiny."' 54 The forms
of regulation described above are exemplary in terms of regulation but
insufficient in terms of accountability for the exercise of public power.
Additional forms of accountability are necessary.
a. Specializedrulesfor government lawyers
Government lawyers and ministries of justice should develop specialized
codes of conduct for government lawyers. I acknowledge the limited
efficacy of ethical codes,"' encapsulated in the image of the Valentine's
Day Card in the operating room.' 6 They may be of limited practical
use because they often do not provide the answers to some of the most
vexing issues that a lawyer may face."' When they do address a subject,
it may only be in the most general of terms. Thus, Deborah MacNair has
written:
Counsel are largely left to their own devices in the exercise of their
profession in the interpretation of these codes. This can result in the
inadvertent creation of double standards for govemment and private

153. MacNair, "The Role of the Federal Public Sector Lawyer," supra note 9 at 127.
154. M. Deborah MacNair, "In the Name of the Public Good: 'Public Interest' as a Legal Standard"
(2006) 10 Can. Crim. L. Rev. 175 at 184.
155. An insightful empirical study found that lawyers generally did not consult the relevant code of
conduct in dealing with ethical problems. See Peter Mercer, Margaret Ann Wilkinson & Terra Strong,
"The Practice of Ethical Precepts: Dissecting Decision-Making by Lawyers" (1996) 9 Can. J.L. &
Jur. 141; Margret Ann Wilkinson, Christa Walker & Peter Mercer, "Testing Theory and Debunking
Stereotypes: Lawyers' Views on the Practice of Law" (2005) 18 Can. J.L. & Jur. 165; Margaret Ann
Wilkinson, Christa Walker & Peter Mercer, "Do Codes of Ethics Actually Shape Legal Practice?"
(2000) 45 McGill L.J. 645; and Margaret Ann Wilkinson, "Information Sources Used by Lawyers in
Problem-Solving: An Empirical Exploration" (2001) 23 Library & Information Research 257.
156. Professor Anthony Amsterdam quoted in Monroe H. Freedman, Lawyers 'Ethics in an Adversary
System (New York: Bobbs-Merrill, 1975) at vii and cited by Gavin MacKenzie, "The Valentine's
Card in the Operating Room: Codes of Ethics and the Failing Ideals of the Legal Profession" (1995)
33 Alta. L. Rev. 859. See also W. Wesley Pue, "Becoming 'Ethical': Lawyers' Professional Ethics in
Early Twentieth Century Canada" (1991) 20 Man. L.J. 227 (describing the history and the process of
the development of the CBA's Code of ProfessionalConduct).
157. For example, few Canadian Codes of Conduct provide concrete advice to the situation involving
physical evidence of a crime also known as "the Ken Murray problem" (see R. v. Murray (2000), 48
O.R. (3d) 544 (Sup. Ct. J.)). For a text that does address this issue see Michel Proulx & David Layton,
Ethics and Canadian Criminal Law (Toronto: Irwin Law, 2001) at chs. 4, 5.
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counsel. Established norms for one may not be the same for the other. One
prevailing norm is that all parties come to court with equal bargaining
power and resources.
Even accepting these arguments at their strongest, I still believe that Codes
of Conduct serve a valuable symbolic function in articulating the values
of the profession.15 9
However, I believe there is a greater value in the articulation of a
specialized code of conduct for government lawyers. The process of
creating such a code would force those involved to articulate and address
the particular ethical challenges and circumstances that they face.' As
former Deputy Minister of Justice and Deputy Attorney General of Canada
John Tait recommended: "each department and agency to develop its own
ethical guidelines, specifically tailored to meet the particular challenges
and circumstances they encounter."'"' Certainly, such specialized codes
have been developed in other countries.' 62
b. Increasedtransparency:policy publication andproactive disclosure
Government should increase the transparency of how it uses legal advice
to exercise public power. As the former Deputy Attorney General of
New Brunswick argued, public confidence in the Attorney-General is
improved by a freer flow of information, by greater candour in explaining
the reasons behind the decisions. He favoured any step that would reduce
suspicion.163 There are two transparency aspects that governments should
pursue: policy publication and case-by-case disclosure.
Governments frequently publish the policies which serve as the basis
for the exercise of power by administrative decision makers. Thus, for

158. MacNair, "In the Service of the Crown," supra note 9 at 517.
159. For an excellent discussion of this issue and the role of codes of conduct generally see Wilner,
supra note 9 at 207-13.
160. See Canadian Centre for Management Development, A Strong Foundation: Report of the Task
Force on Public Service Values and Ethics (Ottawa: Canadian Centre for Management Development,
1996) (Chair, John C. Tait QC) ("The Tait Report") at 40 (each department should develop its own
ethical guidelines, specifically tailored to meet the particular challenges and circumstances they
encounter).
161. Ibid.
162. E.g. New South Wales, The Government Lawyers' Committee of the Law Society of New South
Wales, Guidance on EthicalIssues for Government Solicitors (2003), online: <www.lawsociety.com.
au> cited in Deborah MacNair, "In the Service of the Crown: Are Ethical Obligations Different for
Government Counsel?"(2005) 84 Can. Bar Rev. 501 at 502 note 7. In the United States, see e.g.
Federal Bar Association, Model Rules of ProfessionalConduct for Federal Lawyers (Washington:
FBA, 1990). Former Assistant Deputy Attorney General of Canada and Justice Public Servant in
Residence Elizabeth Sanderson has started drafting such a code for consideration. See Elizabeth
Sanderson, Elizabeth's Rules for Government Lawyers (draft May 2010) (on file with author).
163. Gordon F. Gregory, "The Attorney-General in Government" (1987) 36 U.N.B.L.J. 59 at 70.
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example, there are manuals for the military,'"4 the police,165 the RCMP,166
immigration officials,'16 Canadian Border Services,'16 and tax officials.169
Should government lawyers be any different? They should not.
Most governments already publish very detailed manuals containing
their prosecution policies. The Federal Prosecution Service Deskbook has
been available since at least 2000 and is now posted online on the website of
the Public Prosecution Service of Canada. It expressly boasfs-deservedly
so-of its function in enhancing accountability for prosecutorial discretion:
"Accountability is also enhanced because of the availability to the public
of the Federal Prosecution Service Deskbook, since the public is able to
assess the actions of Crown counsel against the standards set out in the

164. Canadian Defence Academy, Duty with Honour: The Profession ofArms in Canada (Canada:
Canadian Forces Leadership Institute, 2003), online: <http://www.cda.forces.gc.ca/cfli-ilfc/doc/dwheng.pdf>.
165. Justice Institute of British Columbia, British Columbia Police Code ofEthics (British Columbia:
British Columbia Association of Chiefs of Police, 2005), online: <http://www.jibc.ca/police/main/
code of ethics/code of ethicspaper.htm>; Ministry of the Solicitor General, Policing Standards
Manual (2000) (Toronto: Policing Services Division, 2000), online: <http://www.ontla.on.callibrary/
repository/ser/ 10256510/200107.pdf>; Ontario Ministry of Community Safety & Correctional
Services, PolicingStandardsManual Guidelinesfor BoardPolicies (Toronto: Ottawa Police Services
Board, 1999), online: < http://www.police-ottawa.calen/serving ottawa/services board/pdf/board_
policymanualapp_1.pdf>.
166. RCMP, Ethics & Integrity in the RCMP = Ethiqueet intigritda la GRC (Ottawa: Royal Canadian
Mounted Police, Gendarmerie Royale du Canada, 2003); Royal Canadian Mounted Police, Mission,
Vision and Values (Canada: Values and Ethics Office, 2006), online: <http://www.rcmp-grc.gc.ca/pdfs/
rcmp-grc-mission.pdf>.
167. Citizenship and Immigration Canada, Citizenship Policy Manual (Ottawa: CIC, 2009), online:
<http://www.cic.gc.ca/english/resources/manuals/cp/index.asp>;
Citizenship and Immigration Canada, Enforcement Manual (Ottawa: CIC, 2008), online: <http://www.
cic.gc.calenglish/resources/manuals/enf/index.asp>; Citizenship and Immigration Canada, Temporary
Foreign Workers Guidelines (Ottawa: CIC, 2010), online:
<http://www.cic.gc.ca/english/resources/manuals/fw/index.asp>;
Citizenship and Immigration Canada, Information-Sharing Manual (Ottawa: CIC, 2005), online:
<http://www.cic.gc.ca/english/resources/manuals/in/index.asp>;
Citizenship and Immigration Canada, Inland ProcessingManual (Ottawa: CIC, 2010), online: <http://
www.cic.gc.ca/english/resources/manuals/ip/index.asp>;
Citizenship and Immigration Canada, Reference Manual (Ottawa: CIC, 2010), online: <http://www.
cic.gc.calenglish/resources/manuals/irindex.asp>;
Citizenship and Immigration Canada, Overseas Processing Manual (Ottawa: CIC, 2009), online:
<http://www.cic.gc.ca/english/resources/manuals/op/index.asp>;
Citizenship and Immigration Canada, ProtectedPersons Manual(Ottawa: CIC, 2008), online: <http://
www.cic.gc.calenglish/resources/manuals/ppl/index.asp>.
168. Canada Border Services Agency, Code of Conduct (Canada: CBSA, 2008), online: <http://www.
cbsa-asfc.gc.calagency-agence/reports-rapports/acc-resp/code-eng.html>.
169. See, e.g., Canada Revenue Agency, Interpretation Bulletins, online: <http://www.cra-arc.gc.ca/
menu/ITSC-e.html>.
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policies."' In Nova Scotia, under the Public ProsecutionsAct, general
guidelines have to be in writing and published."'
Similar policies or manuals likely exist for non-criminal functions
by government lawyers and they should also be published. There is no
good reason that they are not. Some of these policies likely relate to
rather ordinary functions but others relate to how advice is provided by
government lawyers on critical issues such as the constitutionality of
legislation or the determination of national security confidentiality. Every
once in a while the public gets a glimpse of pieces of such policies or
guidelines.' 72 Their complete contents should be revealed to the public.
As the former Deputy Attorney General of New Brunswick noted, such
measures are likely to have a positive effect on government, lessening
suspicion and increasing public confidence.
Governments do not like to disclose information." But there is no
defensible reason not to disclose such policies when they are already
disclosing criminal policies. Some government lawyers will raise
solicitor-client privilege as a reason to prevent the disclosure of such
policies, claiming that they represent legal advice about how legal advice
is given. Such protestations may be a valid basis to resist an access to
information request under existing law but they are not persuasive as a
matter of logic or policy. First, governments have the power to waive their
right to solicitor-client privilege and they have done so respecting criminal
policy manuals. They can and they should similarly do so with respect
to non-criminal policy manuals. Second, as I have argued elsewhere, the
entire raison d'etre for solicitor-client privilege is highly problematic in
the government context. 7 4 If the dominant rationale for this privilege is
to facilitate full and frank communication between lawyer and client, this
rationale has far less application in the case of policy formulation than in
the case of advice relating to a specific live matter. Government lawyers

170. Canada, Deskbook, supra note 103 at c. 8.3.
171. Public ProsecutionsAct, S.N.S. 1990, c. 2 1, s. 6(a).
172. As in the case where a Department of Justice lawyer testified before a Parliamentary Committee
regarding the standard of "manifestly unconstitutional" used by Government lawyers in evaluating
draft legislation. See supra note 93.
173. See, e.g., Bill Curry, "Access to information risks being 'obliterated': Report" Globe and Mail
(13 April 2010), online: <http://www.theglobeandmail.com/news/politics/access-to-information-risksbeing-obliterated-report/articlel533366/>; Jonathon Gatehouse, "'500 Ways to Say No': Canada's
Access to Information program is in shambles" Macleans (17 May 2010) 22; and David Pugliese,
"Access to Information" The Ottawa Citizen (8 May 2010) BI. See also Office of the Information
Commissioner of Canada, Out of Time (Ottawa: Office of the Information Commissioner of Canada,
2010).
174. See Adam M. Dodek, "Reconceiving Solicitor-Client Privilege" (2010) 35 Queen's L.J. 493 at
527-28, 533.
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may be concerned about a chilling effect when their advice is exposed to
public view. However, policies and manuals regarding how legal advice
should be given are not the works of individual lawyers; rather, they
are corporate documents. While governments enjoy secrecy, one must
seriously question the value to them in maintaining secrecy over such
policies. They appear to be secret for the sake of being secret. They should
be disclosed and published because they provide the basis upon which
government lawyers qua public servants are exercising public power.
Governments should also proactively disclose legal advice in specific
matters. This suggestion obviously poses a greater challenge to governments
in Canada given their obstinacy in disclosing non-criminal legal policies.
However, again the criminal and comparative experiences provide the
models and the justification for such practices. The Federal Prosecution
Service Deskbook provides that "recognition of the importance of public
accountability imposes a duty on Crown counsel in certain circumstances
to communicate the reasons for certain decisions to the public through
the media."'I An example of this rationale in action was provided by the
independent prosecutor in the prosecution of former Ontario Attorney
General Michael Bryant in his filing with the Court and the press the
full reasons for his decision to drop all charges against Bryant.'76 Along
the same lines, in Nova Scotia instructions or guidelines for a particular
prosecution have to be in writing and published.' 7
Governments in Canada steadfastly assert solicitor-client privilege and
rarely disclose legal advice. Of course, they can waive the privilege and
they should-much more frequently. The governments in other countries
routinely disclose legal advice with no demonstrable negative impacts on
the operation of government. When New Zealand adopted a statutory Bill
of Rights in 1990 (NZBORA), it included a provision modelled after a
relatively obscure provision in the CanadianBill of Rights that requires
the Attorney General of Canada to certify that every government bill and
regulation complies with the Bill of Rights. A similar provision exists in
respect to the Attorney General of Canada's duties respecting compliance
with the Charter. Both lawyers in the New Zealand and Canadian
175. Canada, Deskbook, supra note 103 at c. 8.3.
176.. Peter Small & Betsy Powell, "Prosecutor: Why charges against Michael Bryant were dropped"
The [Toronto] Star (25 May 2010) online: The Star <http://www.thestar.com/news/gta/crime/
article/813872--prosecutor-why-charges-against-bryant-were-dropped>. It should be clarified that
the prosecution occurred under Ontario policy and not the Public Prosecution Service of Canada.
However, Ontario has similar policies. See Ontario Ministry of the Attorney General, Crown Policy
Manual: Media Contact by Crown (Ontario: Queen's Printer of Ontario, 2005), online: <http://www.
attomeygeneral.jus.gov.on.ca/english/crim/cpm/2005/MediaContactByCrown.pdf >.
177. Public ProsecutionsAct, S.N.S. 1990, c. 2 1, s. 6.
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departments ofjustice undertake such legal analysis and provide advice to
their respective Attorneys General. The difference is that the New Zealand
Ministry of Justice posts all of these legal opinions on its website."I
In the United States, the Office of Legal Counsel within the Department
of Justice provides advice to the executive branch of government. It has
become associated with the infamous torture memos, legal opinions
regarding the legality of various forms of coercive interrogation methods.
Many ofthose legal opinions were published by the Office of Legal Counsel
itself because it routinely discloses such legal opinions on its website
and they are also available in legal databases."' For those concerned
about the alleged chilling effect that proactive disclosure would have on
providing candid legal advice, the torture memos are not a supportive
case. The Office of Legal Counsel had been disclosing legal opinions for
at least three decades when the torture memos were written. All lawyers
in the Office of Legal Counsel must know that their legal advice may be
disclosed. It has not been demonstrated that such proactive disclosure has
had a chilling effect on the legal advice provided by-lawyers in that office.
What is surprising when one reads the torture memos is the extent to which
they appear to be written completely oblivious to the possibility of their
future disclosure, let alone likely wide circulation within government. The
lawyers who wrote such memos were recently investigated by an internal

178. New Zealand, Ministry of Justice, Advice providedby the Ministry ofJustice and the Crown Law
Office to the Attorney-Generalon the consistency ofBills with the Bill ofRights Act 1990 (Wellington:
New Zealand Ministry of Justice, 2010), online: <http://www.justice.govt.nz/policy-and-consultation/
legislation/bill-of-rights>. American states also upload various legal opinions of Attorney Generals to
different branches of government. For example, Texas has a comprehensive collection of legal opinions
of the last thirteen Attorney Generals online, dating back to as far as 1939. See U.S. Attorney General
of Texas, Greg Abbott, Index to Opinions (Austin: Office of the Attorney General, 2010), online:
<http://www.oag.state.tx.us/opin/opindex.shtml>. See also: New York State Attorney General, Andrew
M. Cuomo, Opinions of the Attorney General,1995-2009 (New York: Office of the Attorney General,
2008), online: <http://www.ag.ny.gov/bureaus/appealsopinions/opinions/index op.html>; State of
New Jersey, Paula T. Dow, Attorney General Formal Opinions, 1949-2010 (Trenton: Office of the
Attorney General, 2010), online: <http://www.nj.gov/oag/ag-opinions.htm>; California, Department
of Justice, Edmund G. Brown, Jr., Legal Opinions and Quo Warranto, 1997-2010 (San Francisco:
Office of the Attorney General, 2010), online: <http://ag.ca.gov/opinions.php>; State of Florida,
Bill McCollum, Attorney General r Advisory Legal Opinions, 1972-2010 (Tallahassee: Office of the
Attorney General, 2008), online: <http://myfloridalegal.com/ago.nsf/Opinions>. Research appears
to reveal that all fifty states publish some of their legal opinions. For a comprehensive collection of
legal opinions, see Attorney General Opinions, DATABASE (Westlaw, earliest available: 1959). For
U.S. federal Attorney General opinions see United States Attorney General Opinions, DATABASE
(Westlaw, earliest available: 1791).
179. United States Department of Justice, Office of Legal Counsel, Memoranda and Opinions, online:
<http://www.justice.gov/olc/opinions.htm>.
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Department of Justice professional conduct office.s 0 Others had already
concluded that the advice contained in those memos was inaccurate if not
misleading."' The lesson from this American experience was that there
was not enough accountability and transparency, rather than too much.
Canadian governments at all levels should institute a similar regime
of proactive disclosure of legal advice. Many governments are already
doing so respecting the expenditure of public funds on the grounds that
the public has a right to know how government officials are spending their
money. Similar arguments regarding the chilling effect on the expenditure
of public funds on necessary activities might be levelled against this
practice. The exercise of public power by government lawyers is equally
if not more important than the travel expenses of public officials. It would
strengthen the democratic conversation between government and the
citizenry.'82 Kent Roach has argued that the case of the Anti-Terrorism
Act provides an example of the type of situation where the disclosure of
legal advice would have enhanced transparency and accountability. Roach
relates how Minister of Justice Anne McLellan argued that the legislation
had been thoroughly vetted by human rights lawyers within the Department
of Justice and was consistent with the Charter. According to Roach,
"[o]pposing legal viewpoints are to be expected, but the process would
have been improved if the legal advice received by the government about
the bill were released to the public. Not all of the government's lawyers'
evolving work product need be released, but the heart of the analysis could
have been included in edited explanatory notes to accompany the bill."'
Such proactive disclosure is a necessary but not sufficient step in creating
a regime of accountability for government lawyers. There is one additional
critical measure.

180. United States Department of Justice, Office of Professional Responsibility, "Investigation into
the Office of Legal Counsel's Memoranda Concerning Issues Relating to the Central Intelligence
Agency's Use of 'Enhanced Interrogation Techniques' on Suspected Terrorists" (2009), online:
<http://judiciary.house.gov/hearings/pdf/OPRFinalReport090729.pdf>.
I 81. See Jack Goldsmith, The Terror Presidency:Law and Judgment Inside the Bush Administration
(New York & London: W.W. Norton, 2007); Bruff, Bad Advice, supra note 87; Joseph Lavitt,
"Professionalism and Power: Flawed Decision Making by the OLC Exposes a Bar That is Losing its
Moxie" (May 2010) 1 California Law Review Circuit 33; Luban, Legal Ethics and Human Dignity,
supra note 85 at c. 5.
182. Cf. Allan C. Hutchinson, Waitingfor Coraf A Critique of Law and Rights (Toronto: University
of Toronto Press, 1995).
183. Roach, "Not Just the Government's Lawyer," supra note 10 at para. 52. Roach continued: "On
such matters, there seems to be little interest in standing on claims of solicitor and client privilege and
Cabinet confidentiality. The spectre that such information when released may be used strategically
against the government either in Parliament or in court does not hold weight because it undermines
the government's claim that the legislation is consistent with the Charter." Ibid.

48 The Dalhousie Law Journal

3. An office ofprofessional responsibilityfor government lawyers
Because of the imperative of fostering accountability for the exercise of
public power, federal and provincial governments should establish an
office of professional responsibility within their respective departments
of justice. The purpose of such an office would be to develop the ethical
standards referred to above, provide a source of ethical guidance and
advice for government lawyers and receive and investigate complaints
against government lawyers. This idea is not original. It finds it source
in the Office of Professional Responsibility of the U.S. Department of
Justice.18 4
. The question could be posed why such an office is necessary in
Canada. However, the question might also be reversed and asked why it
is not necessary in Canada? In fact, on public law and regulatory grounds,
the case for an OPR in Canada is stronger than in the United States. In
the United States, there is a constitutional separation of powers between
the executive and the legislative branches of government designed to
establish a system of checks and balances between those branches.
Executive power at the federal or state level is subject to the scrutiny,
limitation and sometimes override by the legislative branch, whether that
be Congress or a state legislature. In Canada, while we have a functional
separation of powers,' under our parliamentary system of government,
we have a large degree of fusion between the legislative and executive
branches of government. Unless there is a minority government, which
until recently has been rare in Canada,186 the executive effectively controls
the legislature. Proposed laws originate within the executive branch of
government, 87 are drafted based upon legal advice tendered by executive
branch lawyers, and are introduced in the legislature by a minister. The
executive branch decides whether to accept or reject changes proposed at
legislative committees.
Moreover, there is a great imbalance ofresources between the executive
and legislative branches of government in Canada, especially when it
comes to legal advice. Few Canadian legislatures have legal advisers who
can provide legislators with independent legal advice on legislation or other
matters. In the United States, legislative committees have well-resourced

184. United States Department of Justice, Office of Professional Responsibility, online: <http://www.
justice.gov/opr/>.
185. See Khadr v. Canada (Prime Minister), 2010 SCC 3, 71 C.R. (6th) 201, 315 D.L.R. (4th) 1.
186. See generally Peter H. Russell, Two Cheers for Minority Government: The Evolution ofCanadian
Parliamentary Democracy (Toronto: Emond Montgomery, 2008).
187. Private Members Bills are an exception to this description but they rarely become law and do not
play a significant part of the legislative process in Canada.
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staff lawyers who can provide effective counterweights to the position of
executive branch lawyers. Many American legal luminaries have worked as
legislative branch lawyers including Justices Stephen Breyer,'" Clarence
Thomas,18 9 Elana Kagan,' 90 Secretary of State Hillary Clinton,191 forner
Chief of Staff to President Bill Clinton, John Podesta, 92 John Yool9 3 of
the torture memos infamy and Director of Homeland Security Michael
Chertkoff,194 among others. In Canada, government lawyers exercise a
virtual monopoly on the provision of legal advice regarding legislation
and executive branch actions.
In addition, there is more external regulation of government lawyers
in the United States than in Canada. Thus, we should be concerned with
the significant concentration of power within Canadian departments of
justice. If the federal Department of Justice was its own jurisdiction, with
over 2,700 lawyers it would be the sixth largest jurisdiction in Canada.
Effectively, the Department of Justice is a regulatory body of its own
within the larger system of self-regulation. Whereas all Canadian law
societies have made significant strides over the past decade to increase
the transparency of their proceedings and strengthen their accountability
to the public for their mandated role to regulate the legal profession in the
public interest, few ministries of justice have responded in like fashion.
There is both a public and a governmental need for the creation of such
internal accountability. The experience of the Arar inquiry demonstrates
the imperative of creating an office of professional responsibility. 9' Justice

188. Supreme Court of the United States, Biographies of Current Justices of the Supreme Court
(Washington, D.C.: Supreme Court of the United States, 2010), online: <http://www.supremecourt.
gov/about/biographies.aspx>.
189. Ibid.
190. United States Department of Justice, Meet the Solicitor General (Washington, D.C.: United
States Depautment of Justice, 2010), online: <http://www.justice.gov/osg/meet-osg.html>.
191. U.S. Department of State, Biographies: Hillary Rodham Clinton (Washington, D.C.: Office
of Electronic Information, Bureau of Public Affairs, 2010), online: <http://www.state.gov/r/palei/
biog/l 15321 .htm>.
192. David B. Cohen & Charles E. Walcott, "From the Arkansas Outsider to.the Washington Insiders:
The White House Chiefs of Staff During the Clinton Years" (Paper presented to the American Political
Science Association, Annual Meeting 2005, Washington, D.C.) [unpublished].
193. University of California, Berkeley School of Law, Faculty Profiles (Berkeley: Berkeley
School of Law, 2010), online: <http://www.law.berkeley.edulphp-programs/faculty/facultyProfile.
pbp?faclD=235>.
194. Kaitlen J. Exum, "Michael Chertoff" (2005) 66 Curr. Biography 19; U.S. Department of
Homeland Security, Michael Chertoff, Homeland Security Secretary 2005-2009 (Washington, D.C.:
Homeland Security, 2009), online: <http://www.dhs.gov/xabout/history/biography 0116.shtm>.
195. To be clear, government lawyers were not implicated in any way in the underlying events relating
to the transfer of information from Canadian officials to American officials which led to the rendition
and torture of Maher Arar. Justice O'Connor's criticisms related solely to the actions of government
lawyers during the inquiry.
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Dennis O'Connor headed the Commission of Inquiry into the Actions
of Canadian Officials in Relation to Maher Arar (Arar Inquiry). Justice
O'Connor was chosen to head the Arar Inquiry because of his reputation
for fairness, diligence and political sensitivity that he earned in heading
up a public inquiry into contamination of the water supply in Walkerton,
Ontario that resulted in at least seven deaths and over 2,500 people
becoming ill.196 Thus, it is to be expected that Justice O'Connor would
choose his comments carefully. In his Report on the Arar Inquiry, Justice
O'Connor concluded that the government had systematically overclaimed
national security confidentiality.' According to Justice O'Connor, this
had serious ramifications for the administration of justice. He said:
overclaiming exacerbates the transparency and procedural fairness
problems that inevitably accompany any proceeding that can not be
fully open because of the [national security confidentiality] concerns. It
also promotes public suspicion and cynicism about legitimate claims by
the Government of national security confidentiality. It is very important
that, at the outset of proceedings of this kind, every possible effort be
made to avoid overclaiming.m5
It is likely that within the federal government there was some consideration
of Justice O'Connor's comments. However, the federal government made
no public response to Justice O'Connor's criticisms. It is unlikely that
any law society undertook an investigation into the allegations. In any
event, there is no public indication of any such investigation and there was
certainly no discipline proceedings that resulted from Justice O'Connor's
comments.
An office of professional responsibility would help provide the
needed transparency to the process of government lawyering in an age of
increasing concern for transparency and accountability for the exercise
of public power. It would serve a dual purpose of fostering regulatory
confidence for the professional conduct of government lawyers and
accountability for the exercise of public power. But what would an office
of professional responsibility do?
196. Walkerton Inquiry, Report of the Walkerton Inquiry (Toronto: Queen's Printer, 2002) (Hon.
Dennis R. O'Connor, Commissioner).
197. Canada, Commission of Inquiry into the Actions of Canadian Officials in Relations to Maher
Arar, Report ofthe Events Relating to MaherArar:Analysis andRecommendations (The Hon. Dennis
O'Connor, Commissioner) (Ottawa: Canada, 2006) at 302.
198. ibid. at 304 ("I am raising the issue of the Government's overly broad NSC claims in the hope
that the experience in this inquiry may provide some guidance for other proceedings.. Litigating
questionable NSC claims is in nobody's interest. Although government agencies may be tempted to
make NSC claims to shield certain information from public scrutiny and avoid potential embarrassment,
that temptation should always be resisted.").
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Canadian offices of professional responsibility would be both proactive
and reactive. They would be proactive in initiating consultations and
discussions on the creation of codes of conduct for government lawyers.
Such a process would constructively engage and debate the tensions
in the government lawyers' roles qua public servants and qua lawyers.
The attempt to resolve such conflicts would increase confidence for both
government lawyers and the public. These offices would also provide a
source of confidential ethical.advice for government lawyers.
Canadian offices for professional responsibility would also serve an
important reactive function. They would provide, receive and respond
to complaints about ethical conduct of government lawyers from other
lawyers and members of the public. To be clear, I am not advocating for
the creation of large bureaucracy within existing large bureaucracies. I
would not expect Canadian offices of professional responsibility to receive
a large volume of complaints. For reasons explained above, existing
accountability mechanisms within government likely ensure a high level
of competent and ethical conduct by most government lawyers. Thus,
we should not expect to see the same proportion of complaints regarding
ethical conduct of government lawyers that we would see in the general
population. Moreover, most complaints against lawyers in the general
population come from clients. In the case of government lawyers, the
client is unlikely to complain. However, Canadian offices of professional
responsibility could deal with internal complaints against government
lawyers from within government.
Moreover, the existence of a dedicated office of professional
responsibility within government would likely encourage more lawyers
or aggrieved members of the public to come forward. In the absence of
an office of professional responsibility, persons with complaints against
the conduct of government lawyers are left with limited options: they
can complain to the government lawyer's superior-perhaps a Director,
Assistant Deputy Minister or the Deputy Minister; they can complain at the
political level directly to the Attorney General / Minister of Justice; or they
can lodge a complaint with the relevant law society. None of these options
are particularly attractive. A complaint against a government lawyer to the
law society is largely viewed as making a complaint against government
itself. While clients do not hesitate to make complaints against lawyers,
lawyers are more reticent to inform on their own. As indicated previously,
such complaints are rare.
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Similarly, lawyers or members of the public are likely to be reticent
to complain to the government lawyer's superiors.199 Even when such
complaints are made, the process is not transparent. The public has no
idea how many complaints are made against government lawyers, what
the circumstances are or what the resolution is. In short, the process is
informal, ad-hoc and not transparent.
Canadian offices of professional responsibility therefore would
receive and investigate complaints about the conduct of government
lawyers. They could take a variety of actions: dismiss the complaint as
unfounded, discuss the issue with the affected government lawyer, refer
the matter to the government lawyer's superior for action, if found to have
violated a government rule or regulation, refer the matter for discipline
within government or, if they conclude that there is reason to believe that
the government lawyer has violated a provision of a law society's rules or
code of conduct, or refer the matter to the appropriate law society.
The work of the offices of professional responsibility would be
published. Each office of professional responsibility would maintain a
website which members of the bar and the public could access and obtain
information on its work. The office of professional responsibility would
publish an annual report, available on its website, which would provide
both a statistical and substantive analysis of the complaints received and
the resolution of them, while preserving the privacy of those involved.2 00
In short, offices of professional responsibility would create transparency
in the regulation of the conduct of government lawyers where currently
little of it exists in Canada. They would foster accountability and increase
public confidence in the exercise of public power by these important
government officials.
Conclusion
Throughout this paper I have argued that government lawyers are different.
As delegates and agents of the Attorney General, government lawyers
owe special higher duties in comparison to other lawyers. The prevailing
practice of segregating government lawyers' public law duties from their

199. The perspectives on this are likely mixed. Senior members of the bar have told me that they and
their colleagues hesitate to complain about a government lawyer's conduct to their superior. During
my time in government, I was approached on occasion by members of the bar concerned with the
conduct of government counsel and asked what to do. I advised them to contact the government
lawyer's superior but I do not know if such advice was followed or what happened if it was. From
the perspective of government, senior government officials have told me that they frequently receive
complaints about government lawyers from members of the bar.
200. See, e.g., U.S. Department of Justice, Office of Professional Responsibility, Fiscal Year 2008
Annual Report, online: <http://www.justice.gov/opr/reports.htm>.
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ethical duties does not make sense. In fact, if anything, the example of
the higher duties owed by Crown prosecutors is an example of the fusion
of public law and ethical duties. However, all government lawyers, not
just prosecutors, operate at the intersection of public law and legal ethics.
They all have a special responsibility to uphold the rule of law as lawyers,
public servants and agents of the Attorney General. Unlike other lawyers,
government lawyers are involved in the making and the interpretation of
the law. This unique responsibility translates into a higher ethical duty
for government lawyers. They cannot contort the law and they must take
affirmative measures to protect other important elements of the rule of
law.
I have attempted to show how government lawyers exercise public
power and how this necessitates increased accountability for their
actions. I have proposed the creation of specialized codes of conduct for
government lawyers to facilitate a democratic conversation about the
roles of government lawyers and how they should deal with such issues
as "who is the client" and the clash of regulatory responsibilities such as
the whistleblowing example that I provided in the introduction. Increased
transparency through the publication of policies regarding how government
lawyers operate and proactive disclosure of some legal opinions would
shine some much needed sunlight on the exercise of power by government
lawyers. And the creation of an office of professional responsibility along
the American model would explain to the public how complaints of
misconduct are dealt with.
Over the past few decades the number of government. lawyers and
their percentage in the Canadian legal profession has continued to rise. On
both a descriptive and a normative basis, the work of government lawyers
casts shadows on the traditional paradigm of lawyering in Canada which
continues to dominate our thinking. Government lawyers are not "zealous
advocates" or "neutral partisans" nor should they be. They are custodians
of the rule of law in whom we have entrusted significant power for crafting,
interpreting and preserving our laws. They play a critical role in creating
and preserving the rule of law in our country.

